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CONSENSUS OF THE GOVERNED: THE
LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE
Raymond Ku*
What a government of limited powers needs, at the beginning and
forever, is some means of satisfying the people that it has taken all
steps humanly possible to stay within its powers. That is the condition of its legitimacy, and its legitimacy, in the long run, is the condition of its life. 1
Our whole political system rests on the distinction between constitutional and other laws. The former are the solemn principles laid
down by the people in its ultimate sovereignty; the latter are regula, tions made by its representatives within the limits of their authority,
and the courts can hold unauthorized and void any act which exceeds those limits. The courts can do this because they are maintaining against the legislature the fundamental principles which the
people themselves have determined to support, and they can do it
only so long as the people feel that the constitution is something
more sacred and enduring than ordinary laws, something that derives its force from a higher authority. 2
INTRODUCTION

I

N America, "The Law Is King," 3 but who makes that sovereign
law? What procedures must "they" follow? The recent controversy

* A.B. Brown University, 1992; J.D. New York University School of Law, 1995.
The author is a former fellow of the Arthur Garfield Hays Civil Liberties Program at
New York University School of Law. The author would like to thank Thomas Stoddard, Norman Dorsen, Pamela Coukos, and Evelyn Furse for their thoughtful comments, criticisms, and support. This Article is dedicated to those whose voices are not
heard.
1. Charles L. Black, Jr., The People and the Court 52 (1960), reprinted in John H.
Garvey & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Modem Constitutional Theory: .A Reader 202,
207 (3d ed. 1991).
2. Walter F. Dodd, The Revision and Amendment of State Constitutions 253
(1910).
3. Thomas Paine, Common Sense, in Political Writings 1, 28 (Bruce Kuklick ed.,
1989).
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over Colorado's Amendment 24 and Oregon's Measure 95 highlight an
important but little analyzed area of constitutional law: the amendment of state constitutions. 6 This omission is especially glaring considering the growing :importance of state constitutions in the vindication
of individual rights not protected by current Supreme Court interpretations of the U.S. Constitution. 7 The state protection of individual
4. Amendment 2 was proposed by an initiative submitted to the electorate and
approved at the Colorado general election of November 3, 1992. The text of the
amendment reads:
§ 30b. No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation. Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or
school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or
entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status,
quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section
of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing. ·
Colo. Canst. art. II, § 30b.
5. Oregon's Measure 9 was proposed by initiative in 1992. The text of the proposal reads:
§ 41. (1) This state shall not recognize any categorical provision such as
"sexual orientation," ''sexual preference/, and siiTillar ptuases that include
homosexuality, pedophilia, sadism or masochism. Quotas, minority status,
affirmative action, or any similar concepts, shall not apply to these forms of
conduct, nor shall government promote these behaviors.
(2) State, regional and local governments and their properties and monies
shall not be used to promote, encourage, or facilitate homosexuality,
pedophilia, sadism or masochism.
(3) State, regional and local governments and their departments, agencies
and other entities, including specifically the State Department of Higher Education and the public schools, shall assist in setting a standard for Oregon's
youth that recognizes homosexuality, pedophilia, sadism and masochism as
abnormal, wrong, unnatural, and perverse and that these behaviors are to be
discouraged and avoided.
(4) It shall be considered that it is the intent of the people in enacting this
section that if any part thereof is held unconstitutional, the remainiilg parts
shall be held in force.
State of Oregon, Voters' Pamphlet: State of Oregon General Election November 3,
1992 (1992), reprinted in Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking is Not "Republican Government": The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 Or. L. Rev. 19, 36 n.71
(1993) [hereinafter Linde, Campaign].
6. Both amendments were intended to repeal existing laws protecting gays and
lesbians under antidiscrimination laws and preventing the enactment of future laws.
While Measure 9 was defeated at the polls by a vote of 56% to 44%, Amendment 2
passed by a vote of 53% to 47%. Jeffrey Schmalz, Gay Areas Are Jubilant Over Clinton, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1992, at B8.
7. See, e.g., McDuffy v. Secretary of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516,
548 (Mass. 1993) (holding that education is a fundamental right under the Massachusetts Constitution); State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820, 857 (N.J. 1987) (refusing to
subject "procedures that vindicate the fundamental rights ... to the uncertain effects
that ... will inevitably accompany the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule");
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
Harv. L. Rev. 489, 491 (1977) (arguing that state constitutions are the appropriate
vehicle for protecting individual rights).
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rights ·beyond the boundaries established by the U.S. Constitution has
been called the "New Federalism."8 This revolution in federalism and
state constitutional law, however, has met with a significant backlash
in which the Colorado and Oregon initiatives are but acts in a much
larger drama. Former Chief Justice Burger once reminded state citizens that "when state courts interpret state law to require more than
the Federal Constitution requires, the citizens of the state must be
aware that they have the power to amend state law." 9 Many interpreted this advice as applying not simply to state court decisions but
to the acts of local and state governments as well. 10 Having lost in
legislatures or in courtrooms, groups attempted to change existing law
by altering the very foundation of American law, the state constitution.11 The excessively generous amendment procedures embodied in
many state constitutions facilitated this counterrevolution.
The central premise of constitutional governance is that "We the
People" have the power and the right to alter or abolish the form of
government under which we liveP As one commentator argued,
however, "Our constitutional mythology [suggests] that these occasions should be rare and that they should require overwhelming popu8. See, e.g., Michael G. Colantuono, Comment, The Revision of American State
Constitutions: Legislative Power, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Change, 75
Cal. L. Rev. 1473, 1474 (1987) (describing the "New Federalism").
9. Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637, 639 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
10. Colorado's Amendment 2 arose in response to the enactment of city and
county civil rights statutes protecting lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals. Proponents of
Amendment 2 sought to elinlinate all pre-existing civil rights protections and preempt future statutes. See infra text accompanying notes 241-51.
11. In 1982, Florida voters ratified a constitutional amendment which required the
state constitutional right against umeasonable searches and seizures to conform with
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Fla. Const. art. I, § 12. See, e.g., D. Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal
Procedure in 1984: Death of the Phoenix?, quoted in Yale Kantisar et al., Modern
Criminal Procedure 50 (7th ed. 1990) (discussing how Proposition 8 amended California's Constitution to bring California's interpretation of the exclusionary rule in lockstep with the interpretations of the Supreme Court of the United States).
12. These principles apply equally to state constitutions and the U.S. Constitution.
Some commentators have argued that state constitutions fundamentally differ from
the U.S. Constitution because the power of state governments is plenary while the
power of the federal government is lintited. See, e.g., Lawrence Schlam, State Constitutional Amending, Independent Interpretation, and Political Culture: A Case Study in
Constitutional Stagnation, 43 DePaul L. Rev. 269, 279-80 (1994) ("[S]tate constitutions traditionally have been available to lintit the otherwise plenary power of states
to make laws .... ");Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 Wm.
& Mary L. Rev. 169, 178-79 (1983) (characterizing state constitutions as documents of
lintitation and the U.S. Constitution as a grant of specific power). This position, however, is based upon a fundamental misconception of American constitutional theory.
See infra part III. As such, the differences between the U.S. Constitution and various
state constitutions is one of form rather than function. James M. Fischer, Ballot Propositions: The Challenge of Direct Democracy to State Constitutional Jurisprudence,
11 Hastings Canst. L.Q. 43, 46 n.12 (1983) ("[T]he differences between the federal
Constitution a.11d state constitutions are often the result of ballot propositions, rather
than their cause.").
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That the people have an original right to establish, for their future
government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce
to their own happiness, is the basis on which the whole American
fabric has been erected. The exercise of this original right is a very
great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it, to be frequently repeated.
The principles, therefore, so established, are deemed fundamental:
and as the authority from which they proceed is supreme, and can
seldom act, they are designed to be permanent. 14

Constitutional change should be rare because a constitution represents the fundamental law of government meant to endure for genera15
tions and made for "people of fundamentally differing views."
Because the constitution represents fundamental law, the myth requires it to be established by extraordinary means, and these means
are popularly understood as passage by a supermajority16 of either
states or voters. ][fa constitution is easily changed/ 7 it loses its fundamental nature and the distinction between constitutional law and legislation is obliterated. As Justice Marshall stated, "A constitution is
either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or
it is Oil a level with orditJary legislative acts, and, lil~e other acts, is
alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it." 18
In reality, many state constitutions have blurred, if not obliterated,
the line between constitutional law and ordinary legislative acts.
Amending state constitutions is often a commonplace event, and can
be surprisingly simple. 19 Existing procedures make it possible to
13. Michael S. Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the Tiventy-Seventlz Amendment, 103 Yale L.J. 677, 692 (1993).
14. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
15. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (I-IoliTtes, J., dissenti11g).
16. "Supermajorities" are generally defined as any requirement greater than a
simple majority vote on the proposal.
17. Many commentators have considered the ease/arduousness of constitutional
change primarily as a balance between various pragmatic, epistemic, and equitable
concerns such as protecting the status quo, promoting deliberation, protecting minorities, and allowing government to adapt to changing circumstances. See, e.g., Schlam,
supra note 12, at 295-96 ("The amendment and revision process ... must be stringent
enough to provide for continuity in social norms and political rights, but still fterible
enough ... to meet new circumstances."); Colantuono, supra note 8, at 1507, 1509-11
(stating that the difficulty in the amendment process may help to protect minorities);
Lawrence G. Sager, The Birth Logic of a Democratic Constitution 3-4 (Feb. 9, 1995)
(arguing that the procedures used to change a constitution may differ from those used
to adopt one) (presented at the New York University School of Law Colloquium on
Constitutional Theory, on file with the Fordham Law Review). The problem with
state constitutional change, however, is not whether state procedures make change
relatively easy or difficult, but whose views are represented in the outcomes of the
procedures.
18. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
19. See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 12, at 44 ("Amending state constitutions is, by
comparison, an everyday occurrence.").
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amend a constitution with only the support of a minority of the voters
in a state.20 While reforms through these generous amendment procedures have promoted the public good and protected individual liberties,21 they have also eliminated individual rights and served to
disadvantage disfavored groups under the auspices of "higher law.'m
Through this "constitutional legislation," citizens and their representatives can prevent state courts as well as current and future political
majorities from meddling with their policies, principles, or programs
even when the proposals are inconsistent with the public good and the
rights of other citizens. This "constitutional legislation" and the procedures that make it possible are contrary to the general understanding of constitutional law.
The legitimacy of democratic government in the United States is
based on two fundamental premises. First, democratic decisionmaking is legitimate because the U.S. Constitution and the various state
constitutions serve as a limit upon the excesses of democracy.Z3 Second, constitutions are legitimate constraints upon democratic self-governance because they represent the will of the people as a whole. 24
Unlike democratic legislation, however, constitutional amendments
are constrained only by the amendment procedures themselves and
the people's inalienable sovereign authority. In t"bjs context, constitutional legislation is illegitimate because the procedures permit constitutional amendments that do not represent the will of the people as a
whole. For instance, in order to place an amendment on the ballot,
Colorado requires the signature of only five percent of the total
number of votes cast for all candidates for the office of Secretary of
State in the last election,25 and a simple majority of votes to pass the
amendment. 26 These procedures permit constitutional change even
though it may reflect only the views of a minority of the state's
citizens.27
This Article argues that, contrary to current practices, constitutional
change is legitimate only when it commands the unanimous support of
the people, or, because unanimous support is practically impossible,
when it is accomplished through procedural devices (i.e., representa20. For example, Colorado simply requires 5% of the voters for Secretary of State
in the last election to propose an initiative amendment, and a simple majority vote for
ratification. See Colo. Canst. art. 5, § 1.
21. For example, women's suffrage was addressed by initiative and referendum in
Colorado, Oregon, Wyoming, and Arizona. David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide?
An Assessment of the Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. Colo. L. Rev. 13, 45
{1995); see, e.g., Fla. Canst. art. I, § 23 (recognizing the right of privacy); Or. Canst.
art. XI-H (providing for pollution control).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 65-70.
23. See The Federalist Nos. 10, 52 (James Madison).
24. See infra part III.B.
25. Colo. Const. art. 5, § 1.
26. Colo. Const. art. 19, § 2.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 56-64.
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tion, ratification, and supermajority support) that safeguard minority
interests in an effort to determine the public good and approximate
the will of the people as a whole. Constitutional change is illegitimate
when it represents only the will of a portion of the people. This Article attempts to answer the question of what makes a constitution or a
constitutional amendment legitimate, and provides specific contentbased norms, consistent with America's history and form of government, to evaluate the legitimacy of constitutional change.
The examination focuses onthe procedural legitimacy of constitutional change rather than the substantive propriety of constitutional
amendments. To argue that an: amendment to a constitution is unconstitutional is hopelessly circular. 28 One can determine, however,
whether the amendment procedures make it fair to hold individual
citizens responsible for the decisions and actions of the group. In addition, this Article only briefly discusses the role that the U.S. Constitution plays in limiting the substance of constitutional amendments
because many interesting issues of state law do riot fall into the narrow category of rights protected by current Supreme Court interpretations of the U.S. Constitution. As a result, the discussion will focus
primarily on state constitutions because their amendment procedures
have actively rejected the constiiutional myth and accompanying procedural devices that legitimate constitutional change. While acknowledging a constitution as a limit upon the power of government and
"normal politics," many states have adopted procedures for determining what is constitutional that blur, and in some cases obliterate, any
distinction between "higher lawmaking" and "normal politics. " 29
Specifically, this Article examines and critiques the use of the initiative to amend constitutions because the initiative allows a simple
majority to amend a constitution without any mechanisms for determining the will of the people as a whole or for protecting minority
rights and interests. The absence of safeguards is compounded by the
fact that in many instances these "majorities" may only represent a
minority of the citizens in the state. However, "It is the relative ease
by which state constitutions can be amended by a temporary majority
that poses a challenge to state constitutional jurisprudence, not the
particular method by which majoritarian views are implemented. " 30
So while many of the examples used in this Article focus on amend28. But see Jeff Rosen, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?, 100
Yale L. J. 1073 (1991) (arguing that the proposed flag burning amendment would have
violated principles of Natural Law embodied in the Ninth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution). Laurence Tribe has argued that some amendments may be incompatible with fundamental norms embodied within the Constitution; however, the appropriateness of an amendment should be left to Congress not the courts. Laurence H.
Tribe, A Constitution We are Amending: In Defense of a Restrained Judicial Role, 97
Harv. L. Rev. 433, 440-43 (1983).
29. See infra note 222.
30. Fischer, supra note 12, at 47.
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ment by plebiscite, the discussion is a general discussion of constitutional theory and legitimacy. As such, the principles described within
apply equally to other procedures for constitutional change. Similarly, this Article will not discuss the legitimacy of the initiative or
referendum as tools for creating "normal" legislation; others address
that question. 31 For the purposes of this discussion, this Article assumes that these procedures are legitimate for normal politics because
the constitution theoretically provides sufficient safeguards.
Finally, while much of the discussion examines the Founders' words
and actions and the constitutional debates following the American
Revolution, this Article does not look to the intent of the Founders as
some cold, dead hand of history that guides and limits modern day
decisionmaking. Rather, it examines the Founders' theories of government and legitimacy because those theories form the foundation
for American constitutional democracy. Most Americans would probably agree with these foundations. If these ideas, forged on the anvil
of the American Revolution, are to be abandoned, however, it should
not happen silently and without reflection. If the states reject the basic principles of constitutional democracy, they should do so openly.
Such fundamental change should not simply be the result of years of
neglect and erosion.
Part I of this Article describes existing amendment procedures and
examines their justifications. Part II argues that the Founders' theory
of government includes a constitution that represents the will of the
people acting in their sovereign capacity. Part III examines the various procedural methods for defining the people as sovereign and determining their will. Part III concludes that constitutional change is
legitimate only when it represents the will of the people as a whole,
which can be determined by requiring unanimous support or by employing various procedural filters to approximate that will. Given this
analysis, part IV argues that the constitutional initiative is an illegitimate procedure for constitutional change. Finally, part V outlines
some possible legal theories that support the claim that existing procedures are illegal as well as illegitimate.
I.

AMENDMENT PROCEDURES

All American constitutions include some procedure for amendment. As James Madison remarked, "That useful alterations will be
suggested by experience," cannot be denied, "[i]t was requisite therefore that a mode for [altering the Constitution] should be provided."32
31. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial
Equality, 54 Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1978); Louis J. Sirico, Jr., The Constitutionality of the
Initiative and Referendum, 65 Iowa L. Rev. 637 (1980); Philip J. Weiser, Note, Ackerman's Proposal for Popular Constitutional Lawmaking: Can it Realize his Aspirations
for Dualist Democracy?, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 907 (1993).
32. The Federalist No. 43, at 223 (James Madison) (Bucca.1eer Books 1992).
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Amendment procedures recognize two basic principles. First, a constitution may need to adapt to changes in circumstance and understanding. Existing constitutions may inadequately meet the demands
of future generations, or they may embody principles that society has
since rejected. 33 Second, amendment provisions recognize the general
power and right of the people to alter their constitution and government. While the U.S. Constitution and state constitutions share these
basic understandings, the methods for implementing constitutional
change vary from constitution to constitution. Even i11 the states that
allow constitutional amendments through initiative, the procedural requirements vary in difficulty from Massachusetts, with the most stringent requirements, to states like Colorado that employ only mi11i1ual
·
requirements.34
A.

Proposal Requirements

Every constitution in the United States allows the legislature to propose a constitutional amendment, and eighteen states specifically provide for constitutional amendment by initiative. 35 In general, most
state constitutions and the U.S. Constitution requiTe a legislature proposing an amendment to approve the amendment by a majority or

33. See, e.g., U.S. Canst. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (treatLng slaves as three-fifths of a person),
amended by U.S. Canst. amend. XIV, § 2; U.S. Canst. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (prohibiting
Congress from banning slavery until 1808); U.S. Canst. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (requiring
states to return runaway slaves), amended by U.S. Canst. amend. XIII, § 1.
34. Massachusetts requires the signatures of 3% of the entire votes cast for governor to submit a proposed amendment to the general court (both houses of the legislature). The proposed a..mendment must be approved by one-fourth of the general
court in two successive sessions. If approved, the initiative is then submitted to lhe
people who must approve the amendment with votes equal to 30% of the total votes
cast at the last election and also a majority of voters voting on the amendment. See
Mass. Canst. amend. art. XLVIII, pt. 4, §§ 2-5. Initiatives cannot be used to amend
certain provisions of the constitution including the Declaration of Rights. Mass.
Canst. amend. art. XLVIII, pt. 2, § 2. Colorado simply requires the signatures of 5%
of the voters for Secretary of State in the last election to propose an initiative amendment and a simple majority vote on the proposal to ratify the amench-nent. See Colo.
Canst. art. V, § 1.
35. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oldahoma, Oregon, and South Dakota. See The Council of State Goverw11ents, The
Book of the States 1994-95, at 23 (1994) [hereinafter Tile Book of the States]; Michael
Colantuono, Pathfinder: Methods of State Constitutional Revision, 7 Legal Reference
Services Q., Summer/Fall/Winter 1987, at 45, 55-64. Some commentators have suggested that constitutions can be amended by methods not provided for in the text of a
constitution. See Bruce Ackerman, We The People: Foundations (1991); Akhil R.
Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94
Colum. L. Rev. 457 (1994). While there may be non textual methods for constitutional
amendment, this Article argues that those procedures must be consistent \Vith the
principles set forth in parts III and IV of this Article.
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supermajority vote. 36 In all but one state, the electorate must then
ratify the amendment. 37
When a constitution provides for amendment by initiative, the
amendment's proposer is required to obtain the signatures of anywhere from 3% to 15% of the total votes cast in a previous election
for a particular office (i.e., Secretary of State, Governor, or President),38 or in the case of North Dakota, the signatures of 4% of the
state population. 39 If the proposer obtains the requisite number of
signatures, the electorate must then vote on the ratification of the proposed amendment. Most constitutions place no limits on the subject
matter of proposed amendments. Everything in the constitution is fair
game, including the amendment procedures themselves. 40
B. Ratification Requirements
Constitutions also differ as to the number of votes they require to
ratify a proposed amendment.41 The ratification vote has two components, the percentage requirement and the baseline by which the percentage is measured. Percentage requirements run from a vote of
greater than 50% to 75%}2 The baseline also varies. One approach
is to use the total number of votes cast on the amendment itself. 43
Another approach is to use the total number of votes cast at the election.44 A third approach requires that the majority of votes cast in
favor of the amendment equal at least a threshold percentage of the
36. The requirement varies from a simple majority to a three-fourths vote. See The
Book of the States, supra note 35, at 21; Colantuono, supra note 35, at 55-61; U.S.
Const. art. V, § 1.
37. Delaware requires the amendment to be approved by two-thirds of the legislature in two consecutive sessions. The Delaware Constitution does not require the
amendment to be ratified by the electorate. See The Book of the States, supra note 35,
at 21; Colantuono, supra note 35, at 56.
38. The Book of the States, supra note 35, at 23; Colantuono, supra note 35, at 6264.
39. The Book of the States, supra note 35, at 23; Colantuono, supra note 35, at 64.
40. A few states place limits on the subject matter that may be addressed by constitutional initiative. See Mass. Const. amend. art. XLVIII, pt. 2, § 2; ill. Const. art.
XIV, § 3; McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787, 797-99 (Cal. 1948) (holding that an
amendment cannot entirely revise the constitution); see also Fischer, supra note 12, at
55 (noting that a few state constitutions have subject matter restrictions and some
state constitutions limit the reintroduction of subjects for amendment by ballot);
Magleby, supra note 21, at 25 ("Subjects excluded from the ballot in some states include naming a person to office by initiative, emergency legislation, and using the
referendum to block appropriations.").
41. This is true for both constitutional amendments proposed by legislatures or by
initiative. See The Book of the States, supra note 35, at 21-23; Colantuono; supra note
·
35, at 55-64.
42. The Book of the States, supra note 35, at 21-23; Colantuono, supra note 35, at
55-64.
43. The Book of the States, supra note 35, at 21-23; Colantuono, supra note 35, at
55-64.
44. The Book of the States, supra note 35, at 21-23; Colantuono, supra note 35, at
55-64.
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total votes cast at the election. 45 Finally, Nevada requires a majority
vote in two consecutive elections to ratify an amendment. 46 In the
past, the baseline i11. several states was all the eligible voters of the
state,47 "not only those who vote, but those who are qualified yet
failed to exercise the right of franchise. " 48
Most states adopted the baseline of those voting on the proposal to
facilitate the amendment process. Because of low voter turnout, low
votes on proposed amendments, and general lack of interest, more
demanding baselines made the amendment process dif:ficult. 49 At the
time, one commentator pointed out that "Persons voting at an election are usually more interested in the individual candidates than in
the measures proposed .... " 50 As a result, he criticized the election
baseline requirement51 because it "may therefore be said to make the
amending process practically unworkable .... " 52 The reason for his
criticism was that, unless a question was of significant popular interest,
proposed amendments could not ordinarily obtain a majority of an
votes cast at a general election, let alone the support of a majority of
the state's eligible voters. 53 Modem day commentators echo this sentiment,54 and today, the difficulty many voters face in making informed decisions contributes to low voter participation. 55
By allowing amendments based upon a majority of those voting on
the issue, or even a majority voting at the election, current amendment procedures allow a minority or shuple majority of the eligible
voters in a state to amend a constitution. Given the persistent prob45. Mass Const. amend. art. XLVIII, pt. 4, § 5 (requiring at least 30% of the votes
cast at the election); Neb. Const. art. III, § 4 (requiring a threshold of 35% of the
votes cast at the election).
46. Nev. Const. art. XIX, § 2.
47. Idaho, Indiana, Wyoming. See Dodd, supra note 2, at 185-86.
48. Id. at 186 (quoting State ex rel. Blair v. Brooks, 99 P. 874 (Wyo. 1909)).
49. Jd. at 188.
50. Id.
51. !d. at 187. Most states had already abandoned the baseline of the electorate as
a whole. Jd.
52. Jd. at 197-98.
53. ld. at 200.
54. See, e.g., Schlam, supra note 12, at 367 ("Super-majorities for voter ratification
of all amendments seem a superfluous and unconstitutional impediment to the fundamental right to exercise sovereignty"); New Mexico ex rel. Witt v. State Canvassing
Bd., 437 P.2d 143, 153 (N.M. 1968) (stating that requiring a three-quarters
supermajority to amend the state constitution would be illogical); see also Dennis W.
Arrow, Representative Government and Popular Distrust: The Obstruction/Facilitation
Conundrum Regarding State Constitutional Amendment by Initiative Petition, 17 Okla.
City U. L. Rev. 3 (1992) (criticizing excessive barriers to constitutional initiatives);
Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic
Analysis of the Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 111, 162
(1993) ("Although the Framers put the Constitution largely out of the reach of 'Factions' ... they did so at the cost of depriving the majority of meaningful control over
the content of the Constitution .... ").
55. Julian 1~. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Dernocracy, 99 Yale L. J. 1503, 150809 (1990).

} !,
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lem of low voter turnout, 56 these plans permit amendment by a minority, and, "[I]n fact amendments are usually adopted by a minority of
the people and often by a very small minority." 57 For example, Colorado's Amendment 2, a highly publicized and controversial amendment, was ratified by only a fraction of Colorado's citizens. The votes
cast for Amendment 2 represented 50.91% of the total votes cast at
the election, 58 40.63% of registered voters, 59 33.21% of eligible voters,60 30.97% of citizens eighteen years of age and older, 61 and 23.49%
of the total population. 62 As Professor Walter Dodd pointed out as
early as 1910,
The plan of permitting the adoption of proposed amendments if
they receive a majority of the votes cast upon the question of their
adoption or rejection, practically results in the adoption of any proposal to which there is no strong opposition, even though there may
be little sentiment in favor of it. 6:f

Combined with the ability to propose amendments by initiative, existing procedures allow the fundamental law of a state to be amended
to reflect only the view of a minority of voters in the state as long as
there is no significant or effective opposition, and sometimes when
there is genuine opposition. 64
W'nile the facility with which most state constitutions can be
amended should be a source of concern in general, it is especially
troubling because factions have amended state constitutions against
the interests of unpopular and disadvantaged groups. Colorado's
Amendment 2 and Oregon's Measure 9 attempt to prohibit and repeal
laws prohibiting discrimination against gays and lesbians. 65 Similarly,
the California and Oregon Constitutions were amended to frustrate

56. The 55% voter turnout in the 1992 Presidential election ended a 30-year slide
in voter turnout. See Robert Pear, 55% Voting Rate Reverses 30-Year Decline, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 5, 1992, at B4. The United States, however, still ranks as having one of
the lowest rates of voter turnout of all industrialized nations. See 1 Encyclopedia of
Government and Politics 203-04 (Mary Hawkesworth & Maurice Kogan eds., Routledge 1992).
57. Dodd, supra note 2, at 200.
58. There were 1,597,166 votes cast during the 1992 election. Telephone Interview
with Delores Lanier, Librarian, Colorado Legislative Counsel's Office (Apr. 25,
1995).
59. In 1992, 2,003,375 citizens registered to vote. Id.
60. 2,451,000 citizens were eligible to vote. Id.
61. According to census statistics there were approximately 2,628,000 citizens over
the age of 18. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1994
(Sept. 1994).
62. Colorado's total population during 1992 was approximately 3,465,000. Id.
63. Dodd, supra note 2, at 200 n.139.
64. See infra text accompanying notes 230-39.
65. See supra notes 4-5; see Linde, Campaign, supra note 5.
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state constitutional rights to adequate education. 66 The Florida Con67
stitution was amended to make English the officiallanguage. California also amended its constitution to permit housing
discrimination, 68 restrict the rights of criminal defendants protected by
the state constitution, 69 and most recently, California approved Prop70
osition 187, which denies public services to illegal aliens.
C.

Justifications

Commentators generally consider the initiative and referendum to
be the products of the Populist and Progressive movements that saw
representative government as corrupted by moneyed interests and unresponsive to the people. 71 TI1e initiative and referendum were
designed to counteract the political influence of moneyed elites, the
general unresponsiveness of the legislature, and to reflect the genuine
will of the people. 72 TI1e Supreme Court of Oregon, in 1910, expressed the underlying belief of the procedures' supporters that,
"[T]he nearer the power to enact laws and control public servants lies
with the great body of the people, the more nearly does a government
take unto itself the form of a republic-not in name alone, but in
fact:m The continued vitality of the tools of direct democracy also
reflects an emphasis on majoritarian democracy. As one commentator noted, "Majoritarian democracy, we are constantly reminded, is
the core of our constitutional system .... Proponents of direct democracy regularly champion the plebiscite as the means by which to hear
the genuine voice of the people." 74 Adherents of this position include
some of the most distinguished Justices of the Supreme Court. According to Justice Black, "Provisions for referendums demonstrate
de75
votion to democracy, not to bias, discrimination, or prejudice." And
as Justice Holmes stated in his famous dissent, "I think that the word
66. See, e.g., Cal. Const. art. XIIIA, §§ 1-6 (limiting property taxes); Or. Const.
art. ;a,§§ 11a-11f (constitutionalizing the use of local property taxes to fund public
schools).
67. Fla. Const. art. II, § 9.
68. This amendment was struck down by the Supreme Court in Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
69. Cal. Const. art. I, § 28 (Victi.;n's Bill of Rights).
70. B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Court Blocks New Rule on Immigration, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 17, 1994, at A16.
71. See Ellis P. Oberholtzer, The Referendum in America (2d ed. 1912); Jonathan
S. Gellman, Note, Zoning and the Referendum: Converging Powers, Conflicting
Processes, 6 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 97, 110 (1977).
72. Sirico, supra note 31, at 640; Magleby, supra note 21, at 16-17; see also James
A. Morone, The Democratic Wish: Popular Participation and the Limits of American
Government (1990) (noting that progressive reforms were aimed at minimizing the
role of representational intermediaries that stood between the public and its
government).
73. Kiernan v. Portland, 112 P. 402, 405 (Or. 1910).
74. Eule, supra note 55, at 1513.
75. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971).
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liberty ... is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome
of a dominant opinion .... " 76 1hls view is also apparent among a
generation of scholars who feel a need to apologize for the "anti-democratic" nature of judicial review. 77 Liberal constitutional amendment
procedures appear to be the natural outgrowth of equating popular
sovereignty with majoritarian democracy78 and a popular distrust of
representative government.79 Nevertheless, the remainder of the discussion demonstrates that majoritarian democracy is not the core of
our constitutional system, and that existing procedures for constitutional amendment by initiative are inconsistent with accepted principles of constitutional governance.

II. THE

FoUNDATIONS oF CoNSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY

To understand when constitutional change is legitimate, one must
understand what a constitution represents. An examination of the
principles of constitutional government developed during the founding of the U.S. government reveals the essence of a constitution. The
American Revolution was "one of the greatest revolutions the world
has known, a momentous upheaval that not only fundamentally altered the character of American society but decisively affected the
course of subsequent history."80 The Revolution was revolutionary in
two senses: First, it altered the control of government, and second,
and perhaps more importantly, it fundamentally transformed the
terms of political thought. As historian Gordon Wood remarked,
"The Americans of the Revolutionary generation had constructed not
simply new forms of government, but an entirely new conception of
politics .... " 81 Today, U.S. citizens take it for granted that "We the
People" are the source of government power and that the constitution
provides the standard by which all other laws are evaluated-"So enthralled have Americans become with their idea of a constitution as a
written superior law set above the entire government against which all
76. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
77. See Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States 17-18
(1907); James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893); Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States 162-64 (1962); Alexander Bickel, The
Least Dangerous Branch (1962); John H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of
Judicial Review (1980).
78. See generally Schlam, supra note 12 (arguing that to allow for growth of state
constitutional law there must be ease and frequency of textual revision to provide
evidence of popular amenability to change); Amar, supra note 35 (arguing that "We
the People" have a legal right to change the constitution through a majoritarian and
populist mechanism).
79. See Arrow, supra note 54, at 6-15.
80. Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution 5 (1992).
81. Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic: 1776-1787 at viii
(1969). In this discussion, I draw heavily from Professor Wood's remarkable work.
Readers interested in a detailed analysis of the period should read the work in its
entirety.
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other law is to be measured that it is difficult to appreciate a contrary
conception. " 82 Titis section examines the theory that gave birth to this
new conception of government, and what that theory has to say about
the legitimacy of constitutional change. Much of the discussion appears to be straightforward and uncontroversial; however, existing
state amendment procedures seem to ignore this theory or at least
demonstrate how these fundamental premises of constitutional governance have fallen into disfavor.
A. Government as Sovereign
The concept of sovereignty was one of the principle points on which
the Americans and British differed: "The idea of sovereignty, that 'in
all civil states it is necessary, there should some where be lodged a
supreme power over the whole,' was at the heart of the Anglo-American argument that led to the Revolution."83 Prior to the American
Revolution, the government in whatever form was considered sovereign, and its power was unlimited. The people were subordinate to
government and subject to its power.
For example, during the Revolution, Parliament was the supreme
power i.n Britain. All law was "subordinate and controulable at [the]
pleasure of, and created, for the most part, by, parliament" including
the British Constitution. 84 The British made no distinction between
the constitution and law. The terms were synonymous: "For Blackstone and for Englishmen generally there could be no distinction between the 'constitution or frame of government' and the 'system of
laws.' All were one: every act of Parliament was in a sense a part of
the constitution, and all law, customary and statutory, was thus constitutional."85 Given this conception of sovereignty, Parliament could
not violate the constitution or the rights of the colonists. All political
and civil rights owed their existence to Parliament.
Under this conception, the government granted rights. Bills and
statutes securing the people's rights were agreements made between
the rulers and the ruled. Documents like the Magna Carta recognized
and recorded the people's rights against "a power that exists independent of their own choice. "86 The documents embodied the concessions that the people extracted from government in contracts
between the sovereign and the people. As John Adams noted,
" 'Their running in the stile of a grant is mere matter of form and not
of substance.' They were reciprocal agreements, 'made and executed
between the King of England, and our predecessors,' and like Magna
Carta, they were the recognition, not the source, of the people's liber82. Id. at 260.

83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

345 (quoting John Adams' diary).
263.

261.
378.
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ties." 87 If the government breached its contract, the people's only redress was revolution. 88 The Founders. rejected the concept that
government was sovereign and that the rights of the people were subject to its will. From the 1760s through the 1780s, the colonists haltingly developed a revolutionary conception of sovereignty that would
replace the medieval view that government was the supreme power
over all of society.
B. The People as the Fountain of All Power
The American Revolution drastically reconceptualized the concepts
of sovereignty and the written constitution. First and foremost, the
Founders argued that the people, not government, were the supreme
power. Second, they transformed the written constitution from simply
another law created by government to the supreme law created by the
people as sovereign. Finally, the Founders saw government power as
granted by the people through the constitution and subject to its restraints. This conception of government found its roots in Enlightenment rationalism,89 influenced by thinkers such as Locke, Rousseau,
Montesquieu, and Voltaire. The colonists, however, developed a
uniquely American theory of constitutional governance. 90 Tnis theory
was summed up by a commentator of the time:
The constitution should be the avowed act of the people at large. It
should be the first and fundamental law of the State, and should
prescribe the limits of all delegated power. It should be declared to
be paramount to all acts of the Legislature, and irrepealable and
unalterable by any authority but the express consent of a majority
of the citizens ... _9 1

Thus, the Founders envisioned an original form of government in
which the people as sovereign granted power through a written
constitution.
Flipping the classic conception of sovereignty on its head, the Founders maintained that the people, not government, were sovereign.
Time and time again, they stated that "[T]he people are the only legitimate fountain of power." 92 But aside from the rhetorical force of the
statement, what does it mean for the people to be sovereign? During
the revolution and founding, it meant that Parliament had no inherent
authority to govern the colonies. Because Parliament did not derive
87. /d. at 269.
88. See The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
89. Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 22-54
(1967).
90. See generally Wood, supra note 81 (describing the American system of politics
and its underlying assumptions as truly original).
91. Thomas T. Tucker, Conciliatory Hints, Attempting by a Fair State of Matters,
to Remove Party Prejudice 30-31 (Charleston, 1784), quoted in Wood, supra note 81,
at 281.
92. The Federalist No. 49, at 255 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992).
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its authority from the colonists and did not represent their interests,
the colonists were under no legal or moral obligation to obey. Today,
it means that a government's authority and existence is dependent
upon the people. In other words, "All authority is derived from the
people at large, held only during their pleasure, and exercised only for
their benefit." 93 Under this conception, government is not an independent creature with which the people must bargain and negotiate. Instead, legitimate government is the creation and servant of the
people as a whole. It is subordinate to the supreme power-the
people.
This principle of sovereignty is embodied in every constitution in
the United States. For example, the Oregon Constitution states:
We declare that all men, when they form a social compact are equal
in right: that all power is inhe~ent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their
peace, safety, and happiness; and they have at all times a right to
alter, reform, or abolish the government in such manner as they
may think proper. 94
.
And, of course, the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution begins with the
declaration that "We the People of the United States ... do ordain
and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." 95
Having established the people as the supreme power in society, the
Founders needed something to give this concept practical force. The
written constitution became the vehicle for turning rhetoric and theory into political reality. As early as the 1760s the colonists had
moved "toward a definition of a constitution as something distinct
from and superior to the entire government including even the legislative representatives of the people." 96 As Samuel Adams wrote in
1768, "[I]n all free States the Constitution is fixed; and as the supreme
Legislative derives its Power and Authority from the Constitution, it
cannot overleap the Bounds of it without destroying its own foundation."97 This movement culminated in the conclusion that a constitu93. Thcker, supra note 91, quoted in Wood, supra note 81, at 281.
94. Or. Canst. art. 1, § 1. See also Cal. Canst. art. 2, § 1 ("All political power is
inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their protection, security, and
benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform it when the public good may require."); Colo. Canst. art. 2, § 1 {"All political power is vested in and derived from the
people; all government, of right, originates from the people, is founded upon their will
only, and is instituted solely for the good of the whole."); Colo. Canst. art. 2, § 2
("The people of this state have the sole and exclusive right of governing themselves,
as a free, sovereign and independent state; and to alter and abolish their constitution
and form of government whenever they may deem it necessary to their safety and
happiness .... ").
95. U.S. Canst. pmbl.
96. Wood, supra note 81, at 266.
97. Massachusetts House of Representatives to the Speakers of Other Houses of
Representatives (Feb. 11, 1768), in 1 Writings of Samuel Adams 185 (Cushing ed.),
quoted in Wood, supra note 81, at 266.
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tion was no longer a regular act of government legislation, but "the
fundamental law by which all people of the state are governed. It is
the very genesis of government" and limits its power. 98 But what
gives the constitution this power? What makes its control over government legitimate? As Bernard Bailyn stated, "In order] to confine
the ordinary actions of government,· the constitution must be
grounded in some fundamental source of authority, some 'higher authority than the giving out [of] temporary laws.' " 99 The Founders recognized that "This special authority could be gained if the constitution
were created by 'an act of all' .... " 100
The understanding that the constitution is a creation of the people
themselves and distinct from regular legislative acts became clear in
the constitutional debates of the 1780s. With independence, many
state constitutions, as well as the Articles of Confederation, were challenged because they had been adopted by legislatures rather than the
people. For example, South Carolinians charged that " 'we have no
such thing as a Constitution;' the document of 1778 was 'a mere cobweb,' since 'the principles of the Constitution are, at present established no otherwise than by a simple Act of the Legislature.' " 101
Thomas Jefferson criticized the Virginia Constitution of 1776 for the
same reasons. When passed by the legislature, the term constitution is
synonymous with "statute, law, or ordinance." 102 It was absurd to
think that an act of the ordinary legislature could somehow be above
the power of the ordinary legislature. According to Jefferson:
To get rid of the magic supposed to be in the word constitution, let
us translate it into its definition as given by those who think it above
the power of the law; and let us suppose the convention instead of
saying, "We, the ordinary legislature, establish a constitution," bad
said, "We, the ordinary legislature, establish an act above the power
of the ordinar6: legislature." Does not this expose the absurdity of
the attempt? 1 3
An ordinary legislature simply did not have the power or authority to
proclaim the supreme law of a polity. When the Federalists were confronted with the argument that their proposed constitution violated
the Articles of Confederation, it was, therefore, possible for them to
argue that:
Indeed, what did it matter if the Constitution were a violation of the
Articles, since the Confederation bad been "adopted and confirmed
without being submitted to the great body of the people for their
98. Lance v. Board of Educ., 170 S.E.2d 783, 793 (W.Va. 1969) (Haymond, J.,
dissenting).
99. Bailyn, supra note 89, at 182-83.
100. ld. at 183.
101. Wood, supra note 81, at 279.
102. Thomas Jefferson, Writings 249 (The Library of America 1984).
103. Id.
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approbation." The Confederation, it was now possible to argue,
had never rested on "the principle of free governments" and had
been defective and inferior to the state constitutions because it had
never been a real constitution, never having obtained "a hi~her ratification, than a resolution of assembly in the daily form." 04
Because legislatures created these documents, they could change
them. In fact, many of the original state constitutions were subject to
the power of the state legislature. 105 Having differentiated between
fundamental and statutory law, Americans during the founding era
realized that the origins of these documents did not entitle them to the
status of a constitution. A constitution only gains the status of fundamental law when it is adopted and alterable by the sovereign-the
people as a whole. As the West Virginia Supreme Court noted, "Unlike ordinary legislation, a constitution is enacted by the people themselves in their sovereign capacity and is therefore the paramount
law." 106 Conventions of representatives, elected by the people for the
express purpose of adopting and altering a constitUtion, and the people themselves were considered the only legitimate means of determining the will of the people: "Only the people by either 'persons
legally authorized by them or themselves' could create or alter a constitution .... 'The people are the fountain of power, and must agree if
tl1e mode is altered, the asseu.1bly cannot do it.' " 107 Tl1e .bJstory and
development of constitutional governance during the founding period
make it clear that a constitution does not derive its power and legitimacy from its title. It is not enough for the government or a group of
citizens to simply call a document or certain laws a constitution. "It is
108
not the name, but the authority which renders an act obligatory."
A constitution derives its fundamental, "higher law" status only when
it represents the will of the supreme lawmaker-the people acting in
their sovereign capacity.
C.

Constitutional Supremacy

Under this regime, government action is legitia--nate only when it
falls within the power granted by the people through the constitution.
A written constitution, as the direct and basic expression of the sovereign, is "the absolute rule of action and decision for all departments
and offices of government with respect to all matters covered by it,
and must control as it is written until it is changed by the authority
which established it." 109 It applies equally to all elements of govern104. Wood, supra note 81, at 534.
105. See id. at 274-79.
106. Lance v. Board of Educ., 170 S.E.2d 783, 793 (W. Va. 1969) (Haymond, J.,
dissenting).
107. Wood, supra note 81, at 277.
108. Jefferson, supra note 102, at 249.
109. Lance, 170 S.E.2d at 794 (citing 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 56
(1979)).
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ment and to all citizens. But why should a constitution bind the legislative acts of the people's representatives or of the people themselves
when they act through the mechanisms of direct democracy? Why are
these bodies denied the authority to alter a constitution? It appears
contradictory to argue that the people have prohibited government
from establishing religion, when the people, speaking through their
representatives or through a plebiscite, indicate that they wish to establish religion. For the modern theorist this problem represents the
central dilemma for constitutional democracy. In some forms it has
been described as a conflict between the liberty of the ancients and
the liberty of the moderns.U0 In others, it represents the heart of the
claim that judicial review is undemocratic.
Before one abandons the principles of constitutional democracy because it "fails" to adequately resolve this dilemma, however, one must
remember that the Founders faced this very same argument. In a
probing series of articles written in the 1780s, Noah Webster criticized
the developing theory of government. First, he argued that "A Bill of
Rights against the encroachments of Kings and Barons, or against any
power independent of the people, is perfectly intelligible; but a Bill of
Rights [or constitution for that matter] against the encroachments of
an elective Legislature, that is, against our own encroachments on ourselves, is a curiosity in government." 111 According to Webster, the
Magna Carta and the English Bill of Rights made sense because "they
are barriers erected by the Representatives of the nation, against a
power that exists independent of their own choice. " 112 Because no
such independent power existed in the United States, "[t]he jealousy
of the people in this country has no proper object against which it can
rationally arm them-it is therefore directed against themselves, or
against an invasion which they imagine may happen in future ages. " 113
Without any independent powers to struggle against, Webster argued that the concept of a binding constitution was antithetical to
liberty:
In a free government, said Webster, no political or civil regulation
should be perpetual, for the people "have no right to make laws for
those who are not in existence." Jefferson's conviction that the
Constitution of Virginia was defective because it was not created by
a special convention and was thus alterable by the ordinary legislature was foolish, said Webster, and indeed, although Webster did
not draw the connection, did violence to Jefferson's own concern
with the tyranny of the past. Americans' efforts to fix a form of
government in "perpetuity," Webster argued, supposed a "perfect
110. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 201 (1971) (citing Benjamin Constant,
Ancient and Modern Liberty (1819)).
111. Noah Webster, Government, 1 Am. Mag., at 140-42 (1787-88), quoted in
Wood, supra note 81, at 378.
112. /d.
113. ld.
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wisdom and probity in the framers; which is both arrogant and impudent." Indeed, "the very attempt to make pe1petual constitutions, is the assumption of a right to control the opinions of future
generations; and to legislate for those over whom we have as little
authority as we have over a nation in Asia." 114
Webster went on to argue that there was not a practical difference
between constitutional conventions and legislatures. What was a convention anyway, except:
"a body of men chosen by the people h1 the manner they choose the
members of the Legislature, and commonly composed of the same
men; but at any rate they are neither wiser nor better. The sense of
the people is no better known in a convention, than in a Legislature." The distinction between the two bodies was ihus "without a
difference," "useless and trifling." Since the people had to be represented in one body or the other,. "of what consequence is it whether
we call it a Convention or a Legislature? or why is not the assembly
of the representatives of [the] people, at all times a. Convention, as
well as a Legislature?" . . . "The people will choose their Legislature from their own body-that Legislature will have an interest inseparable from that of the people-and therefore an act to restrain
their power in any article of legislation, is as unnecessary as an act

to prevent them from committing suicide."115
For Webster, the legislature and the people were one and the sa.we.
"[T]he legislature has all the power, of all the people. " 116 As such,
Webster's arguments rejected any conception of a sovereign power
over the legislature. While his arguments are powerful, they failed to
grasp the central argument of the new American theory of
government.
The Founders' reply was simple and devastating. There is a fundamental difference between the will of various people and the will of
the people. As Gordon VVood poL"tJ.ted out, "Tl1e legislatl!res could
never be sovereign; no set of men, representatives or not, could 'set
themselves up against the general voice of the people.' " 117 Government whether in the form of kings, legislatures, or groups of citizens
could never claim the authority of the people. The representatives of
the people were not the people themselves: "The representation of
the people, as American politics in the Revolutionary era had made
glaringly evident, could never be virtual, never inclusive; it was acutely
actual, and always tentative and partial. " 118 This conception of representation is also noted by Bruce Ackerman:
Publius adopts the semiotic understanding in his effort to "represent" the people of the United States by means of a written text114. Wood, supra note 81, at 378-79.
115. /d. at 379.
116. Webster, supra note 111, quoted in Wood, supra note 81, at 381.
117. VVood, supra note 81, at 382.
118. /d. at 600.
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the Constitution. There can be no hope of capturing the living reality of popular sovereignty during normal politics. The text does not
aim for phony realism by allowing you to suppose that Congress is
the People. It provides a picture of government which vigorously
asserts that Congress is merely a "representation" of the People, not
.
the real thing itself.l1 9

At best, representatives and groups of citizens can claim only to "represent" the people as paltry images or mere shadows of the people
themselves. At worst, their interests are separate and antithetical to
the general body of the people. By the 1780s, the Founders recognized that the people and their representatives were as capable of tyranny and oppression as any monarch: "An excess of power in the
people was leading not simply to licentiousness but to a new kind of
tyranny, not by the traditional rulers, but by the people themselveswhat John Adams in 1776 had called a theoretical contradiction, a
democratic despotism:mo The Founders had moved beyond Webster's naive conception that legislatures actually were the people, and
that the interests of government and the people were always coterminous. As James Madison told Jefferson:
Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger
of oppression. In our Governments the real power lies in the majority of the Community, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to
be apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to the sense
of its constituents, but from acts in which the Government is the
mere instrument of the major number of the constituents. 121

The constitution therefore was meant to prevent despotism "whether
it came from Kings, Lords or the people." 122
In response to Webster's charge that a constitution infringed on the
liberty of future generations, the Founders' reply was again simple and
devastating. As sovereign, the people always maintained the power to
alter or replace the constitution. They could do this through the
amendment mechanisms provided by the constitution, or by exercising
their primal power as sovereign. 123 The ability of the people to alter
their government, proclaimed Madison, "was one of the 'first princi-

119. Ackerman, supra note 35, at 184.
120. Wood, supra note 81, at 404.
121. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 14 The
Papers of Thomas Jefferson 19 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958).
122. Wood, supra note 81, at 404 (quoting Benjamin Rush).
123. See generally Ackerman, supra note 35 (observing that a dualist constitution
enables the people to exercise their power both directly and through their representatives in government); Amar, supra note 35 (arguing that the people have the legal
right to change the Constitution through majoritarian and populist methods similar to
the popular referendum inlplied in Article V); Colantuono, supra note 8 (listing various state procedures for constitutional amendment or revision).
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pies' of the legal order." 124 The founding philosophy was sunnned up
nicely by James Vvilson:
"In all governments, whatever is their form, hmvever they may be
constituted, there must be a power established from which there is
no appeal, and which is therefore called absolute, supreme, and uncontrollable. The only question," said Wilson, "is where that power
is lodged?" Blackstone had placed it in the will of the legislature, in
the omnipotence of the British Parliament. Some Americans, said
Wilson, had tried to deposit this supreme power in their state governments. This was closer to the truth, continued Wilson, but not
accurate; "for in truth, it remains and :flourishes with the people."
... The supreme power, Wilson emphasized, did not rest with the
state governments. "It resides in the PEOPLE, as the fountain of
government." "They have not parted with it; they have only dispensed such portions of power as were conceived necessary for the
public welfare." ... Unless tl:ie people were considered as vitally
sovereign, declared Wilson with some exasperation, "we shall never
be able to understand the principle on which this system was
constructed." 125

Sovereignty is not merely derived from the people and vested i_n_ government, to be momentarily reclaimed by them through revolution, it
is permanently retained by the people. As such, a constitution is not
antithetical to the liberty of the people, present or future. 126 It only
binds the acts of government and the representatives of the people;
the people as sovereign are always free to change the constitution.
As the preceding discussion makes clear, the philosophical underpinnings of American government clearly distinguish between what
Professor Ackerman describes as "higher lawmaking" and "normal
lawmaking." 127 The former represents the will of the sovereign people. The latter represents the will of the people's representatives
whomever they may be.l28 Having outlined the twin foundations of
124. Amar, supra note 35, at 471. Professor Amar defines the first principles as the
1ight of a simple majority of the people to alter their form of govem;Tient. As used
here, however, "first principles" represents only the right of "the people" to alter
their government. Part IV discusses what constitutes "the people," and specifically
rejects Professor Amar's definition.
125. Wood, supra note 81, at 530. See also ChishoL-n v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
419, 453-58 (1793) (Wilson, J., concurring) (stating that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was incompatible with principles of public law and with a republican form of
government because the state was no more sovereign and no less subject to the law
than a free man).
126. See Ronald M. Dworkin, The Moral Reading and the Majoritarian Default
(Mar. 16, 1995) (arguing that constitutional governance is not antithetical to liberty
because it guarantees the conditions that legitimate majoritarian decisionmaking)
(presented at the NYU School of Law Colloquium on Constitutional Theory, on file
with the Fordham Law Review).
127. Ackerman, supra note 35, at 6-7.
128. As used here, "representative" means anyone to whom the people have delegated decisionmaking authority. This includes elected and appointed officials and any
portion of the people.
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the American science of government-that the people are the sovereign authority in society and that the constitution as the expression of
the people is the fundamental law by which all acts of government are
subject-the following discussion attempts the difficult task of determining what procedures are necessary to legitimately claim that constitutional change represents the will of the people acting in their
sovereign capacity.
Ill

DEFINING "WE THE PEOPLE"

As the preceding discussion demonstrates, American constitutional
democracy is based upon the principle that the people are the fountain of all political power and authority. The people, not government,
are sovereign, and a constitution is the written embodiment of their
will. 129 A constitution, being the expression of the sovereign's will, is
the supreme law by which all other law and government action must
be evaluated. 130 Practically no one publicly disagrees with these
founding principles. In fact, defenders of existing constitutional
amendment procedures may argue that the procedures are simply applications of these principles. Variations in amendment procedures
simply reflect alternative methods for realizing the same goal-determining the will of the sovereign people. But what exactly does "the
people" mean? As Lawrence Sager notes, "[T]o invoke The People is
to invoke what is at best a metaphor . . . . We never have the people in
a very interesting or durable sense; what we have are various mechanisms for doing the best we can to get reports and representations of
the people. " 131 If we accept the founding principles of sovereignty
and constitutional governance, however, there is a limited range of
procedural mechanisms that can be employed as legitimate methods
for determining the will of the people. Before discussing these procedures in detail, this Article first addresses the claim that a simple majority can legitimately claim to speak for the people. 132
129. A constitution can of course be interpreted to embody and promote principles
other than simply the people's will, including natural law and justice. See, e.g., Rosen,
supra note 28 (arguing that natural law imposes additional limits); Christopher L.
Eisgruber, Justice and the Text: Rethinking the Constitutional Relation Between Principle and Prudence, 43 Duke L. J. 1 (1993) (arguing that constitutional norms better
achieve long-term public support for just policies than do moral philosophy policies or
economic analysis); Sotirios A. Barber, On What the Constitution Means (1984) (proposing that the Constitution is open to higher political values and should be interpreted as such). This is consistent with Madison's understanding of the constitution as
well. The Federalist No. 51, at 265 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992) ("Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society.").
130. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 234 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books 1968)
("Seventhly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the whole power of prescribing the Rules
0

0

0

.").

131. Sager, supra note 17, at 21, 23.
132. I assume that the majoritarian definition of "We the People" is the justification
for the more liberal state amendment practices. I am willing to concede, however,
that there may be no rational justification behind those procedures at all.
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Simple Majorities 133

Many state constitutions and some commentators suggest that a
simple majority of the people has the right and power to alter a constitution. Akhil Amar describes this right of a simple majority to alter
government and change the constitution as the first principle of constitutional governance. 134 There are two main arguments i11 favor of
this position. The first, the moral position, argues that something of
moral importance, liberty, and the right to self-determination, is lost
or compromised whenever political decisionmaking is taken away
from simple majorities. The second argument is that the "birth
logic" 135 of the U.S. Constitution supports the claim that a deliberative si_mple majority of Americans is sufficient to amend the Constitution in the name of the people/ 36
A powedul and emotionally appealing argument for simple majority rule, or what Ronald Dworkin calls the "majoritarian default," suggests that procedures requiring more than a majority comprom.ise the
cowuunity's freedom-the right of self-determination or the right of
the people to govern themselvesP 7 As Professor Dworkin points out,
there are two conceptions of democratic collective action: statistical
and communal. Collective action is statistical when it represents a
simple aggregation of individual preferences and actions. Collective
action is communal when it represents "individuals acting together in
a way that creates or presupposes a single action that is together
theirs." 133 A rough way of distinguishing between the two is the difference between the statement that each of us has concluded x and the
statement that together we have concluded x. While the statistical
conception of collective action would appear to support the claim for

133. It appears that no one has argued that constitutional change is legitimate when
supported by only a minority of the people.
134. Amar, supra note 35, at 460. This conception of democracy is consistent with
the classical definition of democracy represented by Aristotle's defir1ition as the "mle
of many." Aristotle, The Politics 88-89 (Stephen Everson trans., Cambridge Press
1988).
135. See Sager, supra note 17.
136. See generally Amar, supra note 35 (arguing that, although not explicitly stated
in Article V, a majoritarian mechanism, analogous to a national referendum, is sufficient to amend the Constitution).
137. Dworkin, supra note 126, at 15. This argument was raised by Noah Webster
duling the founding period. See supra text accompanying notes 111-16.
138. Dworkin, supra note 126, at 14.
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majority rule/ 39 it is inconsistent with the concept of sovereignty of
the people which requires communal action. 140
Liberty in the context of sovereignty of the people is not a matter of
any relation between government and citizens in their statistical and
individual capacities, but rather a relationship between government
and the citizenry under the communal conception of collective action.141 Arguments for self-determination are concerned with the liberty of the people to determine the fundamental law of a polity.
Before the majoritarian default can claim that the liberty of the people collectively is being infringed, however, there must be some connection between the individual and the group that makes it fair and
otherwise sensible to treat her as responsible for the decisions and
actions of the group. Professor Dworkin describes this as "moral
membership, by which we mean the kind of membership that engages
self-government." 142 Mere membership in a community is not
enough. For example, slaves in the United States, women prior to
suffrage, Jews in Nazi Germany, and black South Africans under
apartheid could be described as members of their respective communities, but few if any would argue that they were moral members.
At this point the argument for the majoritarian default turns against
itself. Before a simple majority can claim the legitimate authority to
speak for the community as a whole, the conditions for moral membership, i.e., democratic self-governance, must be satisfied. The decisionmaking procedures must make it fair and sensible to treat the
outcome of the process as a decision made by every individual in the
community. In the context of ordinary legislative acts, there is a presumption that the constitution guarantees these conditions. The constitutional conception of democracy, "presupposes democratic
conditions: the conditions that a community must meet before it becomes true that majoritarian deeisionmaking had an automatic moral
advantage over all other procedures for collective decision." 143 In-

139. This is by no means clear. There is a strong argument that limits upon majority will would in fact increase the individual's freedom to control her destiny. See, e.g.,
Dworkin, supra note 126, at 15 (arguing that "constraints on majority will might well
expand any particular individuals control of his own fate"); John Locke, The Second
Treatise of Government (Library of Liberal Arts 1952) (observing that constraints
upon individual liberty resulting from the social contract expand the individual's ability to control her own destiny).
140. See supra part III.B; infra part N.C. This does not mean, however, that all
collective action in a constitutional democracy must always be communal. In fact, the
framework established by American constitutional governments represents a hybrid
of communal and statistical action.
141. Dworkin, supra note 126, at 15.
142. !d. at 16.
143. !d. at 17.
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eluded in these conditions are freedom of speech, the right to vote,
equal protection, and due process to name just a few. 144
The presumption that the conditions for moral membership have
been met does not exist in the context of constitutional change. Since
a constitution is the fundamental law of a state, when a simple majority acts to change or replace that fundamental law there is nothing to
ensure that they speak for the people as a community. Either the decisions represent the will of the people as a whole or they do not.
Standing alone, simple majority rule does nothing to make it fair or
sensible to treat the decisions of the majority as the decisions of the
minority. 145 There is nothing to guarantee that the conditions for
democratic self-governance are met. As such, simple majority rule
only expresses the will of a group of people, not the will of the people
as a whole. Absent the conditions of moral membership, simple majority rule cannot legitimately daim the authority to bind the minority
in the community to the majority's will. 146
.
The second principal argument supporting simple majority rule is
historical. Akhil Amar argues that the right of a simple majority to
alter or abolish a constitution is evident in the founding of the U.S.
Constitution. 147 Simple majority rule is "a self-evident corollarJ of
popular sovereignty," and is discernible in the words and deeds of the
Founders. 148 After a close examination of the Founders' "words and
144. See generally Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard Univ. Press
1977) (arguing that our background and institutional rights include the fundamental
right of citizens to equal concern which in tum supports the rights of freedom of
expression and freedom of choice in personal and sexual relations among others);
Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton Univ. Press 1987) (arguing that in
a democracy, education must enable all children to participate effectively in the democratic process); Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (1993) (arguing that education and welfare are also conditions for d~mocratic self-governance); Laurence H.
Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the rights of freedom of
communication and expression, political participation, religious autonomy, privacy,
and equal protection); Ely, supra note 77, at 137 (arguing that the U.S. Constitution
protects benefits, goods, and rights that are essential to political participation, and
that the "duty of representation that lies at the core of our system requires more than
a voice and a vote.").
145. Professor Amar concedes this point when he requires simple majority rule to
be deliberative. Amar, supra note 35, at 501-03. "The people must talk, listen, and
vote, and that takes time. (By its very nature, the people's right to alter or abolish 'at
any time' cannot be instantaneous.) But when they do vote, a majority, however
small, must in the end prevail over a minority." Id. at 503.
146. Another related argument is that the principle of equality demands simple
majority rule. Supermajoritarian requirements are considered minority vetoes because they allow a minority to block the will of a majority. While equality may certainly argue in favor of the majoritarian default during ordinary politics, it does not
support simple majority rule for defining the will of the community as a whole. In the
end, the argument for equality is exactly the same as the argument for liberty and selfdetermination. See Dworkin, supra note 126, at 19-21.
147. While Professor Amar's thesis focuses on tlle U.S. Constitution, its principles
are applicable to constitutions in general.
148. Amar, supra note 35, at 484.
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deeds," however, it is far from clear that the Founders believed that a
simple majority could legitimately claim to represent the people as a
community.
As to the Founder's words, Professor Amar presents a series of
quotations from different sources and periods during the founding. 149
The use of some of these quotations is misleading. For example,
Amar cites Noah Webster for the proposition that the Federalists believed that majority rule was a universal truth. 150 As discussed earlier,
however, not only was Noah Webster not a Federalist, he was an articulate opponent of constitutional democracy in general and a firm believer that government, not the people, is the sovereign authority in a
polity. 151 In addition, many of the quotations discussing majority rule
refer to the people represented in constitutional conventions not the
people participating in direct democracy. 152 Rather than analyze and
criticize each of the quotations Professor Amar offers, I offer several
general comments. First, some of the Founders' words do support the
claim that a majority of the people has the right to alter government,
and this is in fact one of the "first principles" of the revolution. 153
Madison himself stated that, "the supreme authority, the federal compact may be altered by a majority of them; in like man.t'ler as the Constitution of a particular State may be altered by a majority of the
people of the State. " 154 This does not mean, however, that a simple
majority necessarily speaks for the minority in the name of the people
as a whole. Instead, it can be understood as simply another way of
describing the people's sovereign right to alter and abolish government for themselves. 155 For example, during the debates over popular
sovereignty prior to the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln argued that selfgovernment was an "absolute and eternal right," but that right did not
include the right to govern those excluded from the community.
"When the white man governs himself that is self-government; but
when he governs himself, and also governs another man, that is more
than self-government-that is despotism." 156 The right to alter government for oneself is not the right to govern another.
149. ld. at 481-87.
150. See id. at 484.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 111-16.
152. Kris W. Kobach, Rethinking Article V: Term Limits and the Seventeenth and
Nineteenth Amendments, 103 Yale L. J. 1971, 1990 (1994) ("When the Framers referred to constitutional amendment by 'the people,' they were speaking of constitutiona! conventions.").
153. See supra part II.
154. Wood, supra note 81, at 533.
155. Cf Rosen, supra note 28, at 1085-86 (arguing that the people's right to alter
and abolish the government is conditioned upon a pattern of abuse and usurpations
or breach of the social compact).
156. Stephen B. Oates, With Malice Toward None: A Life of Abraha.m Lincoln 117
(HarperCollins 1994).
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Second, even if some of the Founders' words support the idea that a
simple majority speaks for the people as a whole during higher lawmaking, contrary to Professor Amar's claim, their deeds tell a different story. Professor Amar focuses on the fact that majority rule was
used to determine the outcomes at the conventions themselves. 157 He
discounts the use of constitutional conventions and the supermajority
requirements embodied in Articles V and VII of the U.S. Constitution
and similar provisions in state constitutions. 158 The existence of these
other procedural requirements, however, and the fact that they were
accepted and followed, cannot be ignored. Nor can they be cavalierly
dismissed as surrogates for a lack of technology which would have
made it possible for genuine direct participation, 159 especially because
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even accepting Professor Amar's interpretation of the Founders'
words, an apparent tension exists between their words and their
deeds. Taken -as a whole, the procedures the Founders employed provide an important key to understanding when the people have legitimately spoken. 161
Third, simple majority rule has no a priori claim to pride of place in
democratic governance. There are many methods or protocols that
the neon!e can employ in democratic decisionl'Tiaking. This does not
mea~, h'owever, that "[T]here are no reasons sounding in the values of
[constitutional] democracy for preferring one protocol of political
choice over another but rather that choice of protocols must be defended, and further that the defense of a given protocol must be seen
in the context of a rather thick understanding of the circumstances in
which it is meant to operate." 162 Simple majority rule may be legitimate in one context while not in another. Its legitimacy depends upon
the circumstances in which the voting protocol is meant to operate
and the principles that govern the political system. As such, Professor
Amm·'s claim that a simple majority can legitimately alter or abolish a
constitution simply begs the question. There is nothing to explain why
a simple majority can clai..'ll the authority to speak for all of society
when the Founders themselves were concerned with democratic despotism. The possibility that "the Founders said so" is both unsatisfying and simply insufficient.
Finally, the Founders' statements may simply reflect the political reality that a majority of people can do whatever they want through the
157. Amar, supra note 35, at 486.
158. Id. at 481-82, 486-87.
159. !d. at 502-03.
160. The Federalist No. 49, at 256 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992) ("The
danger of disturbing the public tranquillity by interesting too strongly the public passions, is a still more serious objection against a frequent reference of constitutional
questions, to the decision of the whole society.").
161. See infra part III.B.
162. Sager, supra note 17, at 23.
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exercise of raw power. Nevertheless, simply because the majority may
in reality have the numbers and the power to change government and
impose their will upon the minority does not make their decisions and
actions just or legitimate. The minority is under no obligation to recognize a constitution or a constitutional amendment simply because it
reflects the will of the more powerful portion of the community"[E]ven an insistent majority should not have its way, if power was the
only thing to be invoked on its behalf. " 163 Constitutional change necessarily implies the legitimate right and power to bind an entire community-not simply a portion of it. Therefore, the concept of popular
sovereignty does not inevitably lead to simple majority rule. In fact,
the following discussion demonstrates that simple majority rule is incompatible with the principles of popular sovereignty.
Democratic Despotism and the Danger of Factions
Factions, and the tyranny that they are capable of, are the most important reasons why simple majorities and minorities cannot legitimately amend a constitution in the name of "We the People." One of
the principal reasons the Founders created the U.S. Constitution was
to respond to a new evil, a new tyrant-the people themselves. In
1776, John Adams called democratic despotism a theoretical contradiction,164 but since the revolution, the American experience with selfgovernance taught them otherwise. James Madison noted that "Complaints are every where ... that the public good is disregarded in the
conflicts of rival parties; and that measures are too often decided, not
according to the rules of justice, and the rights of the minor party; but
by the superior force of an interested and over-bearing majority." 165
James Wilson echoed these sentiments, exclaiming, "Cannot you point
out instances, in which the people have become the miserable victims
of passions, operating on their government without restraint?" 166 By
the 1780s, the Founders realized that the classic republican model
which relied on the virtue of the majority simply did not reflect human
nature. As Madison wrote to Jefferson, "(T]he invasion of private
rights is cheifly [sic] to be apprehended, not from acts of Government
contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the
Government is the mere instrument of the major number of the constituents."167 Jefferson himself recognized this in his criticisms of the
Virginia Constitution of 1776: "[One hundred and seventy-three] despots would surely be as oppressive as one;" it makes no difference that
B.

163. Sunstein, supra note 144, at 19.
164. Wood, supra note 81, at 404.
165. The Federalist No. 10, at 42-43 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992).
166. 1 The Works of James Wilson 291 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., Harvard Univ.
Press 1967) (1804).
167. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 The
Papers of James Madison 295, 298 (R. Rutland & C. Hobson eds., 1977) (footnote
omitted).
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"they are chosen by ourselves. A11 elective despotism was not the govennnent vve fought for." 168 As a result, it was no longer reasonable to
assume that the interests and will of a majority of the people represented the interests of the people as a whole. Thus, the existing
American constitutional model was incomplete.
TI1e American science of government came to recognize the need to
protect the people as a whole from its constituent parts. Factions were
capable of undermining the entire revolutionary endeavor. Madison
defined a faction as, "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a
majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by
some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights
of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community." 169 Now that the authority of government was firmly in
the hands of the people, by the 1780s, the Founders understood that
factions were as significant a threat to liberty as any king, aristocrat,
or foreign government. This stemined from the recognition that people, by their very nature, were not some homogeneous entity sharing
the same interests and aspirations.
As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty
to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions
and his passions \.,.lill have a reciprocal influence on each other; and
the former will be objects to which the latter will atiach themselves
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man
170

And, unfortunately, as Madison adroitly put it, people are not selfless
angels incapable of deviating from the public good or oppressing fellow citizens:
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels

were to govern men, neither external nor internal controuls on government would be necessary. In framing a goverruneni which is to
be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this:
[y]ou must first enable the government to controul the governed;
and in the next place, oblige it to controul itself. A dependence on
the people is no doubt the primary controul on the government; but
experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary
precautions. 171

The Federalists recognized that if left unabated by "auxiliary precautions," people were "much more disposed to vex and oppress each
168.
169.
170.
171.

Jefferson, supra note 102, at 245.
The Federalist No. 10, at 43 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992).
!d. at 43-44.
The Federalist No. 51, at 262 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992).
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other, than to co-operate for their common good.'m2 History has
only confirmed Madison's diagnosis.
While the "auxiliary precautions" devised by the Federalists are
generally associated with controlling factions during normal politics,
they are also mechanisms for controlling factions during higher lawmaking. A key passage from Federalist No. 10 should make this clear:
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the
republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister
views by regular vote: It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is
included in a faction, the form of popular government on the other
hand enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the
public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public
good, and private rights, against the danger of such a faction, and at
the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our enquiries are directed
173

We learn two things from this passage. First, according to James
Madison, a minority of citizens cannot legitimately amend a constitution. They should only be able to express t_heir views by a regular vote
during normal politics with the constitution mitigating the faction's
adverse effects. Second, the Federalists designed the elaborate system
of representation, separation of powers, and checks and balances embodied in the new Constitution to prevent simple majorities from subverting the "public good and rights of other citizens. " 174 Because a
majority can accomplish this through normal politics and potentially
through higher lawmaking, safeguards against majority tyranny are required in both. Nevertheless, even if we interpret the safeguards embodied in the U.S. Constitution and subsequent state constitutions as
controlling the effects of factions during normal lawmaking alone, to
argue that those same factions are entitled to that power outright during higher lawmaking is absurd. The dangers presented by majority
factions do not disappear when it comes to creating or altering a constitution. If anything they increase. Higher lawmaking requires protection of the Founder's vision of "We the People." Only unanimity
or auxiliary precautions that ensure representation of the people as a
whole can legitimate a constitution or constitutional change.
C.

The People as a Whole

The concept that the people are the sovereign authority and source
of all political power is more than mere rhetoric. As discussed above,
it forms the first and fundamental principle of American constitu172. The Federalist No. 10, at 44 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992).
173. !d. at 45.
174. See Sunstein, supm note 144, at 21-23.
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tional democracy. As James Madison stated, "It is essential to ... a
[republican] government, that it be derived from the great body of the
society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it
175
.•.."
In this context, the people is much more than a metaphor. It
means the community as a whole is sovereign, not the government or
any portion of the community. Under this conception, a constitution
represents collective action in a communal rather than statistical
sense. 176 Decisions are meant to represent the "public good" and not
simply an aggregation of individual preferences. 177 As the poet Francis Hopkinson described, constitution making i1wolves "[a] whole people exercising its first and greatest power-performing an act of
sovereignty, original, and unlimited." 178 Therefore, constitutional
change is legitimate only when it represents the will of the people as a
whole. The reason for this was suggested as early as 1776:
"[I]t is absolutely necessary that the whole should be active in the
matter, in order to surrender their privileges in this case, as they
cannot be curtailed without," every adult male, regardless of his
property-holding or the suffrage restrictions provided in the Constitution being established, was entitled to participate-since it was
the society itself that was being constituted .... 179

Massachusetts explicitly incorporated this pril!ciple in its Constitution
of 1780 which "declared itself to be 'a social compact, by which the
whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the
whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good.' " 180 The communal conception of collective actions leads
to two possible methods for dete1mining the will of the people. Constitutional change is legitimate only when it actually commands the
unanimous support of the people, or in lieu of unanimous support,
constitutional change is legitimate if it is accomplished through procedural devices that safeguard minority rights and approximate the will
of the people as a whole.

175. The Federalist No. 39, at 190 (James Maclison) (Buccaneer Books 1992).
176. See supra text accompanyi.11g notes 137-46.
177. See, e.g., Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract at xxi (Hafner Publishing 1962) (1791) ("Society was for Rousseau not an 'aggregation' of individuals but an
'association' .... [L]iving in society represented the triumph of interests that were
clistinctively different from merely individual interests."); Sunstein, supra note 144, at
2 (stating that many Constitutional provisions require neutrality and prohibit partisanship; government decisions that interfere with individual rights must be based in
the public good rather than favoritism).
178. Wood, supra note 81, at 535 (emphasis omitted).
179. /d. at 289.
180. /d.; see also Locke, supra note 139, at 48-54 (stating that when men unite to
form a society they relinquish their inclividual executive powers and authorize society
to make laws for them as the public good requires).
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1. Unanimity
If government is legitimate only when it flows from the people as a
whole, a simple conclusion is that decisions in the name of the people
must actually command the unanimous support of the people. Unanimity is the clearest means of avoiding factional tyranny. As the
Founders recognized, "Factionalism in a republic 'should be particularly guarded against, its existence as a free government depending on
a general unanimity.' " 181 A simple hypothetical illustrates this point.
Suppose there are one hundred people who firmly believe in sovereignty of the people. They have gathered together to form a new government and write a constitution for themselves. In the process of
constitutionmaking, they constantly require consensus. If at any point
one or more members disagrees with the constitutional proposal,
there are several possible outcomes. First, those in favor of the proposal may persuade the dissenters that it belongs in the constitution.
Second, unable to persuade the dissenters that the proposal merits inclusion in the constitution, both groups may reach a compromise and
agree to an alternative proposal. Third, the dissenters may persuade
the proposal's supporters that it does not belong in the constitution, or
the proposal's supporters may simply drop the proposal because the
dissenters cannot be persuaded. Finally, the supporters may insist on
i..11cludi..11g the proposal i.-•1 the constitution despite the dissenters' objections. At this point, the dissenters leave and withdraw as members of
the political communit<j. This does not necessarily stymie the constitution-making process or bring it to a halt. It simply means that the
constitution no longer reflects the will of the original community and
cannot claim authority in their name. In other words, the constitution
cannot legitimately govern the dissenters. The same would be true
with any proposed changes to the constitution. This would appear to
be constitutional governance in its most basic and ideal form. 182
The requirement of consensus is not the child of some esoteric academic theory or some abstract modern day notion of justice. It
originates with the American conception of sovereignty and constitutional governance, and was expressed most recently in the debates
over the ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment Extension
Act. 183 Unanimity is most apparent in the Articles of Confederation
and Article VII of the U.S. Constitution. Both authorities required
181. Wood, supra note 81, at 403.
182. Of course, the inhabitants could agree to different procedures for nonconstitutional decisions. For example, they could agree that within the linlited powers established and circumscribed by the constitution, political decisions could be based on a
statistical model of collective action.
183. One prominent position during the debate over the Equal Rights Amendment
was that ratifications under Article V are to reflect a "contemporaneous consensus."
See Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the
Amendment Process, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 386, 394 (1983) (arguing against absolute Congressional control over the Article V amendment process).
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consent before they subjected a state to the authority of the larger
community. All thirteen states rati_iied the Articles, and no one has
ever suggested that they bound nonsignatories. In addition, the .A.Jticles required the unanimous consent of all the states to alter the document.184 Similarly, the U.S. Constitution required the unanimous
consent of nine states to become effective. 185 The assenting states
could not impose their will upon the dissenting states because, "no
political relation can subsist between the assenting and dissenting
States. " 186 While justice and respect for human rights would always
regulate the affairs between the states, the Constitution would not legally bind dissenters.
Is unanimity necessarily required to amend a constitution? Could
not our hypothetical community unanimously agree to adopt procedures that did not require unanimity to amend an existing constitution? Subject to some logicallirriitations, the answer is, of course, yes.
Though it is by no means logically compelled, the people as a whole
could delegate their power to some portion of them. That portion,
however, does not have the absolute right or authority to do as they
please. The right and authority of the people as a whole to alter or
abolish a constitution remain vested in the people as a whole, not their
delegates. That right is unalienable. As the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 declared, "[T]he community hath an indubitable, unalienable and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish government in
such manner as shall be by that COill!!lllnity judged most conducive to
the public weal." 187 TI1e people's surrogates, as defined by the constitution's amendment and adoption procedures, hold their authority in
trust not only for the founding generation but for future generations
as well. If the surrogates pursue a course of action inconsistent with
the public good or the rights of other citizens, their actions will not
legitimately command the authority of the people. At best, they
would represent political decisions and cornmand the limited authority granted by the constitution; at worst, the constitution would prohibit their actions altogether. lif formerly agreed upon procedures or
the decisions of their delegates always bound the sovereign people,
even when those orocedures and decisions are inconsistent with the
genui11e will of th~ people as a whole, then the constitution would L.1
fact infringe the right of self-determination.l 88
In order to reduce the likelihood that a faction would claim the
right to legitimately amend the constitution in the name of the people,
184. The Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union art. XIII [hereinafter The
Articles of Confederation).
185. U.S. Canst. art. VII.
186. The Federalist No. 43, at 225 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992).
187. Pa. Canst. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. V, reprinted in 5 The Founders'
Constitution 7 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner, eds., 1987).
188. See supra text accompanying notes 137-46.
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our hypothetical community would require certain procedural safeguards to ensure that constitutional amendments are not antithetical
to the will and interests of the people as a whole. Nevertheless, it may
not be enough for a proposed amendment simply to be harmless. The
community may require auxiliary procedures that adopt amendments
which actually represented the will and interests of the people as a
whole. Many of the ratification and amendment procedures embodied in American constitutions can best be understood as serving one
or both of these purposes.
As Professor Amar rightly points out, the Founders did not require
a unanimous vote of the citizens or their representatives to ratify
either the U.S. Constitution or the several state constitutions. Instead,
they employed procedural safeguards and filters. Conventions ratified
constitutions, and proposed amendments were subject to a whole host
of procedural requirements.l 89 The reasons for this approach were
perhaps practical, in part paternalistic, and in part unjust. The Founders' reasons were practical in the sense that it would have been logistically impossible to bring all the citizens in a state, let alone in the
entire country, together to deliberate and vote on the merits of a constitution or amendment; paternalistic in the sense that the Founders
may not have trusted the general body of the people to reach an enlightened decision; and simply unjust because the Founders believed
that certain groups, slaves, women, and the poor in particular, were
not entitled to voice their opinions. 19° Far from allowing simple majorities to alter constitutions as they pleased, however, the Founders
employed various filters in an attempt to both screen the harmful effects of factions from the processes of constitutional change and develop an accurate representation of the will of the people.
2. Republican Filters
In lieu of unanimous support, constitutional change is legitimate if it
is accomplished through procedural devices that safeguard minority
rights and it represents the will of the people as a whole. 191 The
American theory of government recognizes that it is a mistake to assume that equal citizens in a democracy will always act for the public
good. Experience demonstrated to the Founders that people were
quite capable of sacrificing the interests of the community and oppressing other citizens. As Madison noted, "Theoretic politicians,
who have patronized [pure democracy] have erroneously supposed,
189. See supra part I.
190. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Virginia reprinted in Jefferson, supra
note 102, at 264-67 (describing African-Americans as mentally inferior).
191. See Rawls, supra note 110, at 228-34. Cf Colantuono, supra note 8, at 1494-95
(arguing that procedurally arduous means of achieving constitutional change are preferable to extratextual revision of state constitutions). John Rawls' original position is
an example of a procedural device designed to approximate the public good while
protecting the rights of minorities.
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that by reducLng mankind to a perfect equality Ln their political rights,
they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized ancil assimilated in
their possessions, their opinions, and their passions." 192 In an effort to
shield constitutional change as well as normal politics from passions
and factional tyranny, the Founders insisted upon auxiliary precautions which operated under two basic principles: deliberation and
consent. 193 Madison observed that "the deliberative process offers
time for reflection, exposure to competing needs, and occasions for
transforming preferences. Public debate ... ultimately leads to realization of the common good." 194 Consent assures that the decisions
arrived at through the deliberative process are consistent with the will
of the people as a whole. The various procedural devices employed
by the U.S. Constitution and many of the state constitutions promote
one or both of these principles.
The Federalist Papers open with the declaration that "you are called
upon to deliberate on a new Constitution." 195 While the 1780s were
certainly an era of broad public debate, representation was one of the
principal methods for promoting deliberation and reducing the harmful effects of factions during constitutionmaking. By having the people elect a smaller group of citizens to represent them, the Founders
hoped
to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the
medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interests of their country, and whose patriotism and
love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen
that the public voice pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good, than if pronounced
by the people themselves convened for the purpose. 196

Representation was and still is generally employed at the principal
moments of constitutional change-proposal and ratification. The
Philadelphia Convention itself is perhaps the paradigmatic example of
representation at the proposal stage, and as discussed earlier, every
constitution in the United States allows the legislature or constitutional convention to propose amendments. 197 From the very beginning of this Nation's history, and in recent debates over several
192. The Federalist No. 10, at 46 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992).
193. The Federalist No. 38, at 182 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992). Despite his insistence on simple majority rule, Professor Amar is unwilling to allow simple majorities to amend a constitution instantaneously or for any reason. "Majority
rule does not necessarily imply majority will or majority whim." Amar, supra note 35,
at 501.
194. Eule, supra note 55, at 1527; see also Sunstein, supra note 144, at 22 (stating
that "the right to instruct" provision was the antithesis to political deliberation).
195. TI1e Federalist No. 1, at 2 (Alexander Hamilton) (Buccaneer Books 1992)
(emphasis added).
196. The Federalist No. 10, at 46-47 (James Maclison) (BuccaneeT Books 1992).
197. See supra part I.
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proposed amendments to the Constitution, the representation filter
has been an effective means of promoting deliberation at the proposal
stage. 198 The Constitution also employs this filter at the ratification
stage of amendment. The ratification conventions of Articles V and
VII of the U.S. Constitution thus served two purposes. First, the conventions served as a means of legitimizing the new constitution in the
name of the people; 199 and second, as a filter for promoting deliberation on the public good.
Supermajority requirements and approval by successive legislatures
are additional filters designed to approximate the will of the people as
a whole and reduce the effects of factions. By requiring more than
simple majority support, supermajority requirements theoretically
promote careful consideration of the issues. Supermajority requirements accomplish this by forcing those in favor of a particular proposition to persuade a larger segment of the population. Supermajorities
also lend legitimacy to the representative bodies proposing a constitutional amendment. Because representative bodies like legislatures or
conventions are composed of small groups of citizens, there is always
the potential that their interests will diverge from the interests of the
people as a whole. As Madison noted, "Men of factious tempers, of
local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may ... betray the interests of
the people. " 200 Supermajorities make it more difficult for factions to
take control of the amendment process in the representative arena by
forcing them to gain significant support for proposed amendments.
Similarly, approval by successive legislatures not only allows representatives to carefully consider a proposed amendment, it allows the
voters to express their views during the intervening election. This extended time period makes it easier for supporters and opponents of a
particular measure to educate voters who can then elect officials that
represent their viewpoints.
The consent of the governed for the adoption or amendment of a
constitution is obtained through ratification. The principle filters for
establishing consent are representation and supermajority requirements. As discussed above, representative filters like ratification conventions limit the effects of factions. They also assure that the people
give informed consent. In the context of consent, supermajority requirements reduce the influence of factions by increasing the numbers
of citizens involved in the decisionmaking process. The filters bring
the process of constitutional change closer to the ideal of unanimity.
198. See generally Excerpts from Debate on Hoitse Term Limits, N.Y. Times, Mar.
30, 1995, at A20 (providing a recent example of representative deliberation); David E.
Rosenbaum, Budgetary Posturing: Substance Losing Ground to Politics, N.Y. Tnnes,
Mar. 2, 1995, at A1 (discussing proposed balanced budget amendment); Steven A.
Holmes, Flag Amendment Sent to House Floor, N.Y. Tnnes, June 20, 1990, at A14
(discussing the possibility of an amendment banning desecration of the flag).
199. See supra part II.B.
200. The Federalist No. 10, at 47 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992).
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The higher the supermajority requirement the more accurately the
constitutional amendment reflects the actual will of the people as a
whole. Requirements of supermajority support are found in Article V
and Article VH of the U.S. Constitution and historically, in the
amendment provisions of many state constitutions.201 Even Thomas
Jefferson, in later drafts of the Virginia Constitution, required supermajoritarian support, "proposing that the Constitution ... be referred
'to the people to be assembled in their respective counties and that
the suffrages of two-thirds of the counties shall be requisite to establish it,' the Constitution then being unalterable 'but by the personal
consent of the people.' " 202
Closely related to the supermajority requirement is the baseline for
measuring votes. Despite existing state provisions, the baseline for
measuring votes on an amendment should be all the eligible voters in
the state. There are two important reasons for the use of this baseline.
First, by expanding the number of voters that must approve an
amendment to all the voters in the state, the baseline reduces the influence of factions. As Madison noted:
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and
interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same
party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the
more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression.
Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and
interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will
have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if
such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who
feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each
other. 203

By reducing the baseline to those voting on the proposal, states have
wade it much easier for a small fraction of the conununity to pass
amendments inimical to the public interest or the rights of other citizens.204 W'nile factions may still be able to oppress others under the
expanded baseline of all eligible voters, it would be far more difficult.
Second, the baseline is an important tool for determining the consent
of the people as a whole. Amendment procedures that measure the
baseline by the entire electorate in the state provide a far more accurate representation of the people as a whole than those that consider
205
only those voting at the election or on the issue.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

See Wood, supra note 81, at 308-09.
Jd. at 309.

The Federalist No. 10, at 48 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992).
See infra text accompanyh~g notes 242-52.
See supra notes 139-40.
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This leads to an important issue. When a constitution requires a
particular number of votes to pass an amendment (i.e., supermajority
of the eligible voters in a state, or supermajority or majority of votes
at the election), how should non-votes be counted? Any ratification
rule that examines more than the votes cast on a proposed amendment must account for those who choose not to vote. In general, once
a baseline is defined, non-votes within that group are treated as votes
against the amendment because they reduce the number of votes
available to reach the required minimum. 206 Despite the general rule,
at the beginning of this century before the· states liberalized their
amendment procedures, several states attempted to set the default
rule in favor of ratification. 207 As one court stated, if "ten thousand
qualified voters in the state ... did not vote at all on the question ....
Why should they be'L counted in the negative? . . . . These electors
either have no opinion on the subject, or they have none that they
care to express. Why should they be counted as having voted in the
negative, when they did not vote at all on the subject?" 208 The court
viewed non-voters as implicitly consenting to whatever the voters decided. This position is based upon two arguments. The first argument
is that those who vote represent the interests of nonvoters. 209 The
second is estonnel: "Vote and the choice is vours. Don't vote and the
choice is thei;s."210 Courts treat nonvot~rs, because they stayed
home, as if they acquiesced to the decision of those who voted. 211 Existing amendment procedures that require only a majority vote of the
voters on the issue or at the election appear to be based upon this
position.
Neither of these arguments is sufficiently persuasive to justify treating non-votes as abstentions or as votes in favor of a proposed constitutional amendment. First, "We legitimately may question whether
the full citizenry share the preferences of the subgroup who actually
vote on the ballot proposition.'m2 Studies show that nonvoters include a disproportionate number of minorities, the poor, and the un206. For example, if an amendment requires a majority vote of the people voting in
the particular election and only 50% plus one person voting in the election vote on
the amendment, each vote cast on the amendment must be for it in order for it to
pass. The nonvoting people count as votes against the amendment.
207. Dodd, supra note 2, at 191-98.
208. Green v. State Board of Canvassers, 5 Idaho 130, 141 (1896) (quoted in Dodd,
supra note 2, at 192).
209. Eule, supra note 55, at 1515.
210. Id.
211. See, e.g., Tmkel v. Griffin, 68 P. 859 (Mont. 1902) ("It is the theory of our
government that those electors control public affairs who take a sufficient interest
therein to give expression to their views. Those who refrain from such expression are
deemed to yield acquiescence." (quoted in New Mexico ex rei. Witt v. State Canvassing Bd., 437 P.2d 143, 154 (N.M. 1968)).
212. Eule, supra note 55, at 1514-15.
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educated. 213 As such, it is far less likely that they ·will h1 fact be
represented by the disproportionate number of citizens of higher social and economic status who do vote. 214 Second, arguments along the
lines of estoppel are inappropriate when the voting process has builtin obstacles that make it difficult for certain voters to exercise their
right. Confusing ballot language, inconvenient polling times and locations, complex voting and registration requirements, and a history of
voting discrimination all contribute to low voter turnout leaving the
hands of those who vote far from clean.Z15 Finally, given these difficulties, when the goal is to determine the fundamental law of a state
as expressed by the people as a whole, affLrmative action is essential.
If the people as a whole genuinely desire constitutional change, requiring them to express that desire through the affirmative act of voting is not too much to ask. As one state court commented while
discussing its requirement that only a majority of the people voting at
the election ratify an amendment:
This requires affirmative action. A majority of all those voting at
the election must vote in favor of the proposition in order to adopt
the same. The convention that framed the constitution doubtless
[sic] presumed that if an amendment was necessary and really de216
sired by the people, a majority would favor its adoption ....

When change is huportant enough and a genuine consensus exists, obtaining the requisite number of votes should not be an issue. In other
words, a constiiutional quorum should exist before the business of
constitutional change can be conducted. Vvhile a combination of filters may allow a simple majority of the state's eligible voters to adopt
a constitution, this does not suggest that a minority of voters iil. a state
can legitimately amend a constitution.
While commentators have questioned the appropriateness of
supermajority requirements, their critiques fail to recognize a principle justification for the requirements-they better approximate the
213. !d. at 1515.
214. Magleby, supra note 21, at 33-34 ("Voting on ballot propositions only amplifies the social class bias in participation, because those with lower incomes or less
education tend to skip voting on ballot questions at much higher rates.").
215. See generally David B. Magleby, Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot Propositions in the United States (1984) (discussing the process of direct legislation); Frances
F. Piven & Richard A Cloward, Why Americans Don't Vote (1988) (discussing how
the electoral process inhibits voting by lower and working class citizens); E. E.
Schattschneider, The Semi-sovereign People 97-113 (1960) (noting the large percentage of nonvoters and discussing the causes and effects of this phenomena); A Leon
Higginbotham, Jr., et al., Shaw v. Reno: A Mirage of Good Intentions with Devastating Racial Consequences, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1593 (1994) (describing the prevalence
of racism in North Caroliila electoral politics and the racist practices used to keep
African-Americans from voting); Pamela S. Karlan, Not by Money But by Virtue
Won? Vote Trafficking and the Voting Rights System, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1455 (1994) (discussing the effects of vote trafficking).
216. State ex ref. Stevenson v. Babcock, 22 N.W. 372, 375 (Neb. 1885).
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will of the people as a whole. Commentators have challenged
supermajority requirements as inegalitarian because they grant the
minority veto power in the decisionmaking process. 217 While the critics acknowledge these requirements' ability to protect minorities and
promote both stability and deliberation, they feel that these results are
outweighed by considerations of equality and various pragmatic concerns.218 This conclusion may be appropriate under a statistical conception of collective action; however, the criticism does not apply
under the communal conception. 219 Therefore, in the context of constitutional change, these arguments fail to recognize the primary role
of supermajority requirements. Supermajorities provide a more accurate approximation of the will of the people as a whole. Although the
protection of minority rights and the promotion of stability and deliberation are important goals, they are secondary benefits derived from
a process meant to approximate the will of the people as a whole. 220
In summary, constitutional change is legitimate only when it represents the will of the people as a whole. The ideal requirement for
determining that will is, of course, unanimity. If all the citizens in a
state agree to a proposed amendment, there is no question that "the
people" have spoken. 221 Unfortunately, unanimity is an ideal that is
practically unachievable in large communities. In lieu of unanimity,
constitutional change is legitimate when accomplished through the use
of a combination of procedural safeguards and filters that ensure that
the adopted constitution or constitutional amendment represents the
will of the people as a whole, promotes the public good, and safeguards the rights of dissenting citizens. These safeguards and filters,
217. See Schlam, supra note 12, at 357-67; Note, Supermajority Voting Requirements: Possible Constitutional Objections, 55 Iowa L. Rev. 674, 674 (1970). The
Supreme Court, however, has consistently upheld the constitutionality of requiring
supermajority votes against equal protection challenges. See Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action at the Local Level, 430 U.S 259 (1977) (upholding the
requirement that proposed changes in a county charter be approved by a majority of
both city and non-city voters within a county, as opposed to a simple majority of all
voters within tlle county); Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971) (upholding
supermajority requirements).
218. Schlam, supra note 12, at 363-64.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 137-46.
220. See supra part III.B.
221. The 1\venty-Seventll Amendment raises tlle interesting question of how to determine the will of the people over time. Can an amendment legitimately be ratified
by considering a combination of voters over a period of two hundred years? In a
recent article, Professor Paulsen argues that the principles which govern legislation
should apply to constitutional amendments. See Paulsen, supra note 13 (arguing that
consent based upon ratification by several generations is legitimate and legal). However, the concept of the people as a whole necessarily involves some limits on the time
for ratifying amendments. The ratification of constitutional amendments is supposed
to represent the consent of the people, not some people today and some people long
since gone. As such, a better rule would limit the validity of constitutional ratifications to the consent of the living. Any other rule would allow the constitution to be
amended by portions of the community over a period of time.
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representation, deliberation, supermajority and baseline requirements, enter the process at two stages: proposal and· ratification.
During the proposal stage these auxiliary procedures ensure that the
drafting of the amendment reflects the will of the people. At the ratification stage, they assure that the proposed constitutional change
commands the support of the people as a whole. Without these filters
and procedural safeguards for constitutional change, the connection
between those in favor of an amendment and the dissenters would not
be sufficient to fairly or sensibly hold the dissenters responsible for
the proponents' actions. Under certain circumstances this may be acceptable for the creation of legislation and the adoption of statutes,
but it is unacceptable for the adoption and alteration of a constitution
which represents the fundamental law of a state and the will of the
people as a whole.

N.

EXISTTI'-TG STATE PRACTICES

While most people pay lip service to the principle that a constitution represents "the people," in practice many states have returned to
the medieval conception of sovereignty that pits the people against
the government. The only difference is that today the sovereign is
defined as the will of a majority. 222 Existing procedures for amending
constitutions allow a minority of voters to alter the fundamental law
of the state by defini11.g a majority in terms of those voting on the
proposed amendment, instead of as a majority of citizens in the state
or even a majority of eligible voters. For these reasons, many existing
state procedures for constitutional change are illegitimate. The most
flagrant of these procedures is the constitutional initiative, which, in
several states, virtually eliminates any distinction between statutory
and constitutionallaw. 223
In the name of efficiency, existing initiative procedures allow for
constitutional change without unanimity or any republican filters. 224
222. See supra part HI.B.
223. In severaj states the procedures for adopting a statute or a constitutional
amendment are identical, see, e.g., Colo. Const. art. V, § 1, cl. 2 (amended 1980); or
practically identical, see, e.g., Or. Const. art. IV, § 1(2)(b)-(c) (requiring signatures of
6% of eligible state voters to propose a statute and 8% of the eligible state voters to
propose a constitutional amendment); Cal. Elec. Code § 3524 (West 1977 & Supp.
1994) (requiring signatures of 5% to propose a statute and 8% to propose a constitutionaj amendment). In contrast, Massachusetts i;!itiative procedures carefully distinguish between legislation and constitutional amendments. See Mass. Const. art.
XLVIII, pt. IV, § 1 (defining an "initiative amendment"); Mass. Const. art. XLVIII,
pt. V, § 1 (stating the legislative procedure for an "initiative petition for a law").
224. Dodd, supra note 2, at 200 ("Except with reference to matters of great importance, it may therefore be said that [procedural safeguards make] constitutional alteration too difficult .... "); Schlam, supra note 12, at 377 ("[T]here must be, at least
initially, a sufficient ease and frequency of textual revision, if for no other reason than
to provide evidence of popular fu-nenability to\vard change.'' (citation omitted)). See
also Arrow, supra note 54, at 88 (constructing "a positive case for enhancement of the
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This change is illegitimate because the procedures make no effort to
ensure that the adopted amendment represents the will of the people
as a whole. They allow a small number of citizens to draft and propose an amendment without any concern for the public good or the
protection of dissenters' rights. Furthermore, a simple aggregation of
a fraction of the state's citizens sharing personal preferences can then
ratify the amendment. 225 As one commentator noted, "Written in secret by those who share a common view of societal problems, ballot
propositions eschew compromise and tend toward extremism with appalling frequency." 226 Colorado's Amendment 2 is a perfect example
of an amendment drafted by a private group in an effort to enforce
their personal conception of morality at the expense of fellow citizens,
and then ratified by a simple majority of votes on the issue. 227 An
initiative process with an absence of safeguards for representing the
will of the people cannot legitimately effect constitutional change.
The Federalists explicitly rejected constitutional initiatives because
they would play to the public's prejudices and passions, and "constitutions, in particular, need to be protected against the danger of 'interesting too strongly the public passions [by] ... frequent reference of
constitutional questions to the decision of the whole society.' "228 The
initiative was inappropriate because during direct appeals to the public, "'lhe passions therefore not the reason, of the public, would sit in
judgment. But it is the reason of the public alone that ought to controul and regulate the government. The passions ought to be controuled and regulated by the government." 229 Practical experience
has since confirmed Madison's theoretic conclusions. 230
The fact that there is little to suggest that the initiative represents an
informed decision on the part of the voters compounds the problems
with the initiative. As Derrick Bell noted, "Appeals to prejudice,
oversimplification of the issues, and exploitation of legitimate concerns by promising simplistic solutions to complex problems often
characterize referendum and initiative campaigns." 231 Studies on the
initiative process have found that of the voters who actually vote on
popular democratic devices, most particularly, for facilitation of the state constitutional initiative"); Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 54, at 162 (stating that the
Framers "depriv[ed] the majority of meaningful control over the content of the Constitution, ... serving the efficiency goals of constitutionalism").
225. See infra notes 242-53 and accompanying text (discussing Colorado for Family
Values' constitutional amendment initiative abolishing legal protection for
homosexuals).
226. Fischer, supra note 12, at 66.
227. Amendment 2 was passed by approxintately 54% of the vote on the issue. See
Schmalz, supra note 6.
228. Linde, Campaign, supra note 5, at 33 (quoting The Federalist No. 49, at 340
(James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1982)).
229. The Federalist No. 49, at 258 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992).
230. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
231. Bell, supra note 31, at 19.
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the subject, "only fifteen percent of those surveyed felt that they consistently knew enough about initiative measures to make a wise decision. "232 Voter manipulation compounds the lack of informed
decisionmaking. Advertising campaigns, and even the wording of the
measure, are often designed to mislead voters. 233 For example, during
an initiative campaign to give the bus and truck industry the right to
pay a fiat tax in lieu of all other taxes, the supporters of the proposal,
having failed to convince the public through education, distributed on
billboards and leaflets- the- picture of a "big, fat, ugly pig" with the
following slogan: "Drive the hog from the road! Vote yes on proposition number 2." 234 The amendment passed overwhelmingly "because
the voters thought they were voting against roadhogs. •ms This kind of
misinformation and prejudice has tremendous influence on the passage of constitutional initiatives.236
Money also influences the outcomes of constitutional. initiatives.
Spending is often the single most powerful predictor of a proposal's
success at every stage in the amendment process.Z37 For example,
"One California public relations official boasted that he could put any
issue on the California state ballot for $325,000.'>23 8 Lenient signature
requirements and the use of professional signature gathering organizations have virtually eviscerated any protection signature require..:I"
•
....
•
• •
•
h
ments anora.~~- ;:')IDlllar1y, spenumg mnuences lllitlat1ve outcomes ~Y
"manipulat[ing] the electorate and monopoliz[ing] the 'market place
of ideas.' "240 The initiative and referendum were tools that the pro~,.

.. "')':1.0

,...,.

"'1

1

232. Eule, supra note 55, at 1516. The study went on to discover that "[a]nother
37% claimed to know enough about the issues involved to make a wise decision on
ballot measures 'most' of the time. The remaining 47% admitted to confusion on a
regular basis." Id. at n.46 (citing Joint Project of the USC Institute of Politics and
Government & Common Cause (1985)).
233. See id. at 1517-19; see also Weiser, supra note 31, at 925-35 (discussing how
nondemocratic forces, such as low voter turnout, "the strong influence of money,"
and the manipulative framing of issues undermine the referendum procedure).
234. Fischer, supra note 12, at 67 n.118 (quoting A. Shamish & B. Thomas, The
Secret Boss of California 37-38 (1971)) (emphasis omitted).
235. Id.
236. Bell, supra note 31, at 21.
237. Weiser, supra note 31, at 927 (citing Betty H. Zisk, Money, Media and Grassroots 90 (1987)).
238. Bell, supra note 31, at 20.
239. See, e.g., Note, The California Initiative Process: A Suggestion for Reform, 48
S. Cal. L. Rev. 922 (1975) (discussing various defects in the signature gathering process); see also Bell, supra note 31, at 20 (criticizing the use of signature gathering
companies for direct voting procedures).
240. Weiser, supra note 31, at 927 (quoting Daniel Lowenstein, Campaign Spending
and Ballot Proposition: Recent Experience, Public Choice Theory and the First
Amendment, 29 UCLA L. Rev. 505, 608 (1982)); see also Bell, supra note 31, at 20
n.76 ("[T]he defeat of many consumer and environmental referenda is usually caused
by major television campaigns which distort the issue and raise the false spectre of
massive unemployment. [Ralph Nader] accused the atomic power industry and its
allies of using such scare tactics promoted at a cost of millions of dollars." (citing
Ralph Nader, Direct Democracy via Referenda, Wash. Star, Nov. 6, 1976, at C1)).
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gressive movement designed to challenge representative government
because it was corrupt and unresponsive to the people. 241 As it exists
today, however, the initiative process has been corrupted by the very
same evils it was designed to correct.
Colorado's recent experience with Amendment 2 demonstrates the
constitutional initiative's deficiencies. Prior to 1992, the cities of Denver, Aspen, and Boulder, and other local governments within Colorado, enacted statutes which extended civil rights protection to
lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals.Z42 These statutes were designed to
protect homosexuals from discrimination. In response, Colorado for
Family Values ("CFV"), a local Colorado organization funded by
prominent national religious organizations, sought to repeal these
statutes and prohibit future statutes by performing an end run on the
political process through the constitutional initiative.Z43 The organization drafted Amendment 2 in private. 244 The initiative process does
not require public debates or hearings or solicitation of comments
from the general public. Like all special interest groups, CFV had
little need for debate on the merits of their proposed amendment.
The organization's members shared a common vision on homosexuality and proper social values. 245 In fact, they formed the organization
for the sole purpose of promoting its members' shared beliefs i.-·1
Amendment 2. 246 CFV drafted and proposed Amendment 2 without
any consideration for other viewpoints, and, one may even argue, to
spite those with different viewpoints.Z47
241. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
242. Pamela Coukos, Recent Development, Civil Rights and Special Wrongs- The
Amendment 2 Litigation, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 581, 583 (1994).
243. /d. at 583-84.
244. Amendment 2 was apparently drafted by Will Perkins, the head of Colorado
for Family Values. See Dirk Johnson, I Don't Hate Homosexuals, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14,
1993, at 24.
245. According to CFV, "Sexual molestation of children is a large part of many
homosexuals' lifestyle-part of the very lifestyle 'gay rights' activists want government to give special class, ethnic status!" Id. at 584 n.18 (quoting Colorado for Family
Values, STOP Special Class Status for Homosexuality 2). Sinlilar sentiments were
expressed by tlle proposers of tlle Oregon initiative who denounced homosexuality as
"abnormal, wrong, unnatural, and perverse," and akin to pedophilia, sadism, and masochism. See supra note 5.
246. CFV was formed in 1991 in response to tlle successful enactment of local ordinances protecting individuals from discrimination based upon sexual orientation. Its
mission was to "pro-actively lead and assist tllose opposing the militant homosexual
attack on traditional values." See Colorado for Family Values, Amendment 2 & Beyond (1993), quoted in Stephanie L. Grauerholz, Comment, Colorado's Amendment
2 Defeated: The Emergence of a Fundamental Right to Participate in the Political Process, 44 DePaul L. Rev. 841, 847 (1995). According to CFV's leader, the group will
"disband if the anti-gay-rights measure was upheld in Colorado. 'Our guitar has one
string.' " Johnson, supra note 244, at 24.
247. CFV's mission statement reads:
The mission of COLORADO FOR FAMILY VALUES is to pro-actively
lead and assist tllose opposing tlle militant homosexual attack on traditional
values; to act as a resource equipping grass-roots efforts through education
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Colorado's ratification requirement did nothing to ensure that the
amendment reflected the will of the people as a whole.2 48 CFV deceptively and inaccurately characterized the purpose of the amendment
and homosexuals in generaF49 Rather than presenti.Ilg the voters
with the issue of whether lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals should be
protected under antidiscrimination laws, CFV successfully framed the
issue of the amendment as a denial of special rights. CFV designed
this misinformation to play to public fear and prejudice.250 As one
commentator describedit,"Witha rallying cry of 'No Special Rights,'
CFV argued that without Amendment 2, gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals would enjoy special status, including a legally protected right to
commit pedophilia."251 Through this misinformation, CFV successfully encouraged a large rural turnout and overcame the proposition's
primarily urban opposition by a bare majority of the votes on the proposed amendment. 252 Colorado's experience with Amendment 2
clearly demonstrates how factions can manipulate the constitutional
initiative to successfully propose and ratify a constitutional amendment adverse to the rights of other citizens and a far cry from representing the will of the people as a whole. Given the ease with which a
faction can manipulate the amendment process in the absence of adeand training of like-minded organizations and individuals across America
dedicated to preserving the fundamental freedoms of speech, association, assembly, belief and conscience protected by Colorado's Amendment 1\vo; to
preserve the right to disagree with and resist, in a civil and compassionate
manner, the forced affirmation of the homosexual lifestyle.
Colorado for Family Values, Amendment 2 & Beyond (1993), quoted in Grauerholz,
supra note 246, at 847 n.48.
248. For constitutional amendment, the Colorado Constitution requires only a simple majority ratification by the people who vote on the amendment. See Colo. Const.
art. V, § 1.
249. For example, CFV used videos portraying gays as violent, flamboyant, and as
threats to children. Johnson, supra note 244, at 24. The CFV video mischaracterized
the purpose of the amendment:
The riot is an example of what happens when gays mobilize, the film declares, 'just one part of an aggressive nationwide offensive aimed at every
segment of society to force the acceptance and approval of their chosen lifestyle.' A shot of one protester's sign declaring a 'Queer Holy War' drives the
point home.
Heather Rhoads, Cruel Crusade: The Holy War Against Lesbians and Gays, Progressive, Mar .. 1993, at 18 (1993).
250. Weiser, supra note 31, at 929 n.l11 ("For example, Kevin Tebedo, co-founder
of the CFV, testified that the CFV inaccurately and unfairly depicted homosexuals in
its advertising to gain support for the amendment by portraying homosexuals as a
dangerous group demanding 'special rights.' ").
251. Coukos, supra note 242, at 584.
252. Weiser, supra note 31, at 929 (citing Dirk Johnson, A Ban on Gay-Rights Laws
Is Put on Hold in Colorado, N.Y. TilDes, Jan. 16, 1993, at A6). See supra text accompanying notes 58-62. The success of Colorado's initiative prompted the leader-of the
Oregon anti-gay measure to vow to revisit the issue with a "Colorado-style" amendment. Dirk Johnson, Colorado Homosexuals Feel Betrayed, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1992,
at A38.
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quate safeguards, the constitutional initiative is a strikingly inappropriate method for constitutional change.
The underlying purpose of a written constitution is to represent the
will of the people as a whole and protect citizens from tyranny in all
forms-including fellow citizens. As the Supreme Court of West Virginia stated:
The underlying purpose of written constitutions is that there may be
a safe and definite harbor for the ship of state in times of tempest.
Great tribulations of government do not arise in periods of administrative calm. They manifest themselves when the clouds are heavy.
It is then that a constitution proves its worth in preserving for the
people those fundamental principles of free government which are
indispensable to the well-being of our democratic institutions.
If organic law be subverted through expediency, the basic guaranties of liberty are thereby imperiled.253

Existing state practices have apparently forgotten or rejected the basic
principles of American constitutional democracy. Because the constitutional initiative permits factions to adopt measures contrary to the
public good and the rights of citizens, the factions cannot claim to legitimately speak in the name of the people, and their measures cannot
legitimately claim the pedigree of constitutional law.
V.

SoLUTIONS

If we take seriously the Revolutionary idea that all political authority is derived from the people as a whole, and not from some inconsequential portion of them, it becomes clear that procedures that allow a
constitutional proposal to represent only a portion of the community
cannot legitimately claim the authority to amend the fundamental organic law of the state-the constitution. Nevertheless, does illegitimate necessarily mean illegal? Of course, deviations from the
amendment procedures specified in a constitution are illegaJ.254 While
a comprehensive discussion of these remedies is beyond the purview
of this Article, this section briefly sketches some possible legal remedies when the amendment procedures specified by the constitution itself are illegitimate. In terms of formulating judicial standards, one
should keep in mind that while evaluating various procedures for constitutional change, unanimity is the ideal condition for legitimate constitutional change. The level of scrutiny applied to amendment
253. Berry v. Fox, 172 S.E. 896, 903 (W.Va. 1934).
254. Dodd, supra note 2, at 212.
The authorities are thus practically uniform in holding that whether a constitutional amendment has been properly adopted according to the requirements of an existing constitution is a judicial question . . . . [I]t is the
absolute duty of the judiciary to determine whether the constitution has
been amended in a manner required by the co11stitution ....
Jd. at 214 (quoting McConaughy v. Secretary of State, 106 Minn. 392, 409-10 (1909)).
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procedures should correspond with the degree of deviation from the
ideal.
If we allow states to serve as laboratories of democracy and radicaHy experiment with the principles of government, federal courts
must take the role of the U.S. Constitution as a means of protecting
individual rights more seriously. 255 As Justice Brennan observed:
Adopting the premise that state courts can be trusted to safeguard
individual rights, the Supreme Court has gone on to limit the protective role of the federal judiciary. But in so doing, it has forgotten
that one of the strengths of our federal system is that it provides a
double source of protection for the rights of our citizens. 256

States may only experiment with democracy because the U.S. Constitution provides a secure safety net.
The most obvious federal source of protection is the Republican
Guaranty Clause. 257 While the Supreme Court has limited the scope
of the Guaranty Clause,Z58 given the absence of adequate procedural
safeguards, illegitimate state constitutional amendment procedures,
like the initiative, provide a clear example of a justiciable claim. As
Judge Wisdom wrote:
The line of judicial development of the republican guarantee, bent
and broken since Luther v. Borden, is not beyond repair. Some
day, in certain circumstances, the judicial branch may be the most
appropriate branch of government to enforce the Guaranty Clause.
Federal courts should be loath to read out of the Constitution as
judicially nonenforceable a provision that the Founding Fathers considered essential to formulation of a workable federalism. 259

As one commentator has noted, "[C]Iaiil1S under the Guaranty Clause
may be justiciable where the violation of the republican norm is
clear. " 260 As the preceding discussion demonstrates, the people as a
whole are the source of constitutional authority. This is the fundamental and first principle of republican government which distinolli<::hf'<:: thP
v--'-'
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constitutional change represents the will of the people as a whole, it is
255. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
clissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
256. Brennan, supra note 7, at 502-03.
257. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government .... ").
258. See, e.g., Edward A Stelzer, Bearing the Judicial Mantle: State Court Enforcement of the Guarantee Clause, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 870 (1993) (cliscussing the Supreme
Court's position that issues arising under the guaranty clause are nonjusticiable political questions).
259. Kohler v. Tugwell, 292 F. Supp. 978, 985 (E.D. La. 1968) (Wisdom, J., concurring) (footnote omitted), aff'd, 393 U.S. 531 (1969).
260. Fischer, supra note 12, at 62.
261. See supra part II.B.
J.,
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as illegitimate and inimical to liberty and the principles of constitutional government as any permanent military government.262 The absence of adequate safeguards that guaranty the conditions of
democratic membership make the constitutional initiative a clear example of a violation of the republican norm. Procedures for constitutional change can be seen along a spectrum of legitimacy and legality
with.unanimity on one end and Colorado~style initiatives on the other.
While the legality of these procedures may at points become a question of degree (i.e., how many and what kinds of filters are adequate),
the Supreme Court is quite capable of applying this analysis when
constitutional rights are concerned. 263 By undermining the principles
that form the foundation of constitutional governance, existing state
amendment procedures provide a clear case for Guaranty Clause
protection.
The constitutional initiative and similar state amending procedures
may also violate what some commentators have described as the due
process of lawmaking.264 Under this concept, the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires rationality and deliberation.265 One commentator also suggests that state constitutional
amendments could be subject to attack based upon vagueness. 266 Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment always provides general restraints
on the substance of state constitutional amendments. 267 As Chief Justice Burger noted, "It is irrelevant that the voters rather than a legisla262. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 222 n.48 (1962) (stating that the Guaranty Clause
may be invoked by the judiciary in the case where a state has established a permanent
military government).
263. The Supreme Court regularly applies an undue burden analysis in cases concerning constitutional rights. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992)
(applying undue burden analysis to abortion); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968) (applying undue burden analysis to free speech); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963) (applying ilndue burden analysis to religious freedom).
264. See e.g., Hans A. Unde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 Neb. L. Rev. 197
(1976) (discussing what due process means as a constitutional standard for lawmaking) [hereinafter Linde, Due Process]; see also Lawrence G. Sager, Insular Majorities
Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 91 Harv.
L. Rev. 1373, 1418 (1978) (stating that the claim for a "due process of lawmaking"
requirement is particularly strong when substantial constitutional values are in jeopardy and where judicial review of legislative enactments is largely unavailable).
265. See Linde, Due Process, supra note 264, at 222-35; see also Fischer, supra note
12, at 72-76 (proposing that a process of principled decisionmaking would satisfy the
requirements of due process); Sunstein, supra note 144, at 134-35 (arguing that democracy requires that political outcomes be produced by an extended process of deliberation and discussion).
266. Fischer, supra note 12, at 66-69.
267. See, e.g, Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (holding that a California
State Constitutional amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the state was involved in racial discrimination); Evans v.
Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994) (holding that Amendment 2 violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution), cert.
granted, 115 S. Ct. 1092 (1995); Coukos, supra note 242, at 597 (arguing that Amendment 2 fails to meet the rational basis test).
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tive body enacted [this law], because the voters may no more violate
the Constitution by enacting a ballot measure than a legislative body
may do so by enacting legislation. "268
State courts and constitutions may also provide legal protection.
State courts may examine the legality of amendment procedures
under the U.S. Constitution. 269 While the federal arguments are not
without their difficulties, it is far more difficult to argue that existing
state amendment procedures are illegal under the state constitution.
One legal theory is tharthese practices violate the particular state constitution's popular sovereignty clause. 270 State courts could also examine many existing amendment procedures under· the same
principles and with the same scrutiny applied to regular legislative acts
under the theory that, in some cases, an amendment may not legitimately be fundamental constitutional law. This practice would explicitly recognize what many state ·courts have implicitly recognized for
years. 271 Finally, state courts may analyze the constitutional initiative
under the "ratchet principle" articulated by the· Supreme Court in
Katzenbach v. Morgan,Z72 which would allow the initiative to expand
constitutionally protected rights but not diminish them.Z73 If all else
fails, and factions continue to abuse state constitutions and their
amendment processes, there is always revolution.
CoNcLusioN
In an age of growing factionalism and discord, as new and previously silent groups begin to assert themselves in the political arena, as
old groups struggle to "maintain their own," we must never forget that
the underlying purpose of a written constitution is to organize a government and a society in which we all can live. While at times we will
disagree, we will have agreed on how to disagree. Gone are the days
when brute force and raw power were sufficient to legitimate political
authority. The American legacy is the principle that government must
command the respect of the entire people, lest society disintegrate
268. Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley,
454 u.s. 290, 295 (1981).
269. See Evans, 882 P.2d at 1335; Stelzer, supra note 258.
270. See supra text accompanying note 94.
271. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 366 (N.Y. 1982) (stating
that a provision's simple inclusion in the state constitution does not automatically
classify it as fundamental for the purposes of equal protection analysis); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1017 (Colo. 1982) ("The Colorado Constitution does not restrict itself to addressing only those areas deemed fundamental.
Rather, it contains provisions which are both equally suited for statutory enactment
... as well as those deemed fundamental to our concept of ordered liberty .... "
(citations omitted)).
272. 384 u.s. 641 (1966).
273. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10 (1966) (arguing that Congress has the power
to expand t.lJe rights recognized under the Fourteenth Amendment, but cannot reduce
those rights, much like a one-way rachet).
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into warring factions and plunge us all into a nightmarish Hobbesian
state of nature. A constitution represents the framework in which we
memorialize the principles on which we all agree-especially the
methods by which we agree to disagree. Failure to include a group or
individual within this framework necessarily excludes them from the
constitution's and, therefore, the government's legitimate authority.
Legitimate constitutional change is an extraordinary act, not because the procedures themselves must be difficult for the sake of being difficult, but because it reflects the magnitude of the taskarriving at the consensus of the governed. The principle that the people are the fountain of all power is the very foundation of American
constitutional democracy and has been reaffirmed throughout our nation's history. This principle does not mean, however, that our constitutional governments and the rights they protect are secure, or that
the actions perpetrated in the name of "We the People" are always
just. Noah Webster was right when he said that "[l]iberty is never
secured by such paper declarations; nor lost for want of them. " 274
And, as Bruce Ackerman eloquently noted:
There is simply no escaping the fact that the fate of the Constitution
is in our hands-as voters, representatives, justices. If we allow
ourselves to abuse the tradition of higher lawmaking, the very idea
that the Constitution can be viewed as the culminating expression of
a mobilized citizenry will disintegrate. After all, the American Republic is no more eternal than the Roman-and it will come to an
end when American citizens betray their Constitution's fundamental ideals and aspirations so thoroughly that existing institutions
merely parody the public meanings they formerly conveyed.275

The legitimacy of constitutional change is not simply an academic
question. The procedures and their outcomes affect the lives of real
people. The day after Amendment 2 was passed, a despondent Colorado citizen committed suicide rather than live in a state that would
sanction discrimination against its citizens. Hauntingly reminiscent of
Patrick Henry's bold revolutionary declaration, 276 the suicide note
read, "I refuse to live in a state where a few people can, at will, make
my life a living hell." 277 Justice and the legitimacy of constitutional
governance depend upon our continued commitment to the principle

274. Wood, supra note 81, at 377.
275. Ackerman, supra note 35, at 291.
276. Patrick Henry, Speech to the Second Virginia Convention (Mar. 23, 1775) ("Is
life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery?
Forbid it, Almighty God! I know not what course others may take; but as for me, give
me liberty, or give me death!"), reprinted in The American Reader: Words that
Moved a Nation 20 (Diane Ravitch ed., 1990).
277. Jana Mazanec, Colorado Gays Say Harassment Escalating, USA Today, Nov.
12, 1992, at 3A.
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of "government of the people, by the people, for the people.'m8 Ultimately, we are responsible, individually and collectively, for the justness and continued legitimacy of our government.

278. Abraham LincoLn, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), reprinted in The
American Reader, supra note 275, at 151.

